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INHERENTLY SUSPECT

INTRODUCTION
All contracts “restrain trade” in some sense, but section 1 of the Sherman Act
bans only those that restrain trade “unreasonably.”1 Restraints are unreasonable,
in turn, if they create or maintain market power without producing offsetting
efficiencies.2 Such agreements divert resources to less valuable uses and thus
reduce society’s wealth.
If enforcement and adjudication were costless, agencies and courts could
apply this “rule of reason” on a case-by-case basis, effortlessly distinguishing
agreements that produce net harm from those that are harmless or create wealth.
In the real world, however, contracts and the markets they inhabit are complex
phenomena, the ultimate economic effects of which are not always apparent.
Plaintiffs and enforcement agencies bear the burden of convincing tribunals that
* Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. © 2016, Alan J. Meese.
1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58–60 (1911).
2. See infra notes 20–22, 81–89 and accompanying text.
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such agreements produce harm, and proponents of challenged agreements may
invest significant resources defending them. Therefore, case-by-case application
of a “full-blown rule of reason” consumes resources that could produce economic value elsewhere. Indeed, the full-blown rule of reason can generate other
social costs as well. For instance, the prospect of spending resources to defend
challenged agreements—even those that ultimately survive scrutiny—can induce firms to adopt practices that forestall such challenges but create less
wealth.3 Moreover, placing onerous burdens on plaintiffs can discourage challenges to harmful restraints, undermining antitrust’s regulatory mission. A
society that hopes to maximize its wealth will consider these various costs when
choosing between the full-blown rule of reason and other possible methodologies for analyzing challenged restraints.
Not surprisingly, courts and enforcement agencies applying the rule of reason
have developed shortcuts that sometimes reduce the cost of such analysis, albeit
at the potential cost of less accurate determinations. Perhaps most famously,
courts and agencies declare certain categories of agreement “unreasonable per
se,” thus mandating condemnation of such restraints without proof that they
cause economic harm in a given case. In particular, applying the test announced
in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, courts condemn as unlawful
per se categories of agreement that both reduce rivalry between the parties and
always lack any redeeming virtue.4 Because nearly all challenged agreements
reduce rivalry in some sense, the outcome of this test depends on whether some
agreements in a given category may nonetheless produce one or more virtues by
creating technological efficiencies or mitigating a market failure. Like all rules,
per se rules are overinclusive, but they also conserve administrative, judicial,
and private resources that society can use elsewhere, potentially increasing the
nation’s wealth. Moreover, by reducing the costs that private plaintiffs and
enforcement agencies must incur to challenge harmful restraints, such rules can
enhance deterrence of wealth-destroying conduct.
Naked horizontal price fixing and market division are quintessential examples
of conduct deemed unlawful per se. During antitrust’s “inhospitality era,” courts
declared other agreements unlawful per se, drawing upon economic theory
hostile to various contracts that, although not naked, thwarted atomistic competition by restraining the conduct of trading partners.5 By the mid-1970s, courts
had declared an increasing number of restraints unlawful per se,6 leaving
3. See infra notes 193–95, 213–15 and accompanying text (collecting judicial and academic authorities to this effect).
4. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (describing the inhospitality tradition).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 601–02, 608 (1972) (banning horizontal
territorial allocations ancillary to otherwise legitimate joint venture); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Co., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969) (banning ties by firms with “economic power”); Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (banning vertical maximum resale price maintenance), overruled by State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)
(banning nonprice vertical restraints, including exclusive territories, location clauses, and customer
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remaining agreements subject to the full-blown rule of reason.7
Over the past few decades, developments in economic theory have convinced
courts to abandon various per se rules, with the result that many agreements
once deemed unlawful per se now merit full-blown rule of reason scrutiny. This
test requires plaintiffs to prove economic harm to establish a prima facie case.
Because plaintiffs fail to satisfy this requirement ninety-seven percent of the
time, judicial refusal to declare a category of restraint unlawful per se is
effectively a declaration that such restraints are lawful.8
Courts, agencies, and scholars have rightly concluded that recognition of just
two categories of section 1 analysis—full-blown rule of reason scrutiny and a
dwindling number of per se rules—would force tribunals to choose between
outright condemnation of challenged restraints on the one hand, and de facto
legality disguised as full-blown rule of reason analysis on the other. The “all or
nothing” character of this approach, which many describe as “dichotomous,”
led some to explore possible modifications of this methodology.9 This exploration began with the premise that restraints that avoid per se treatment are not all
created equal; some are usually beneficial, whereas others pose a significant risk
of competitive harm.
This Article examines one modification of the traditional dichotomous approach, the “quick look,” which courts and enforcement agencies embraced
nearly three decades ago. This modification recognizes a third category of
restraints subject to section 1: those that are “inherently suspect.” Such restraints properly escape per se condemnation but supposedly pose a greater risk
of economic harm than most restraints. The quick look streamlines the process
for evaluating inherently suspect restraints by dispensing with the ordinary
requirement that plaintiffs prove that the restraint produces harm. Proponents of
this approach claim that the quick look reduces enforcement and adjudication
costs while ensuring more accurate assessment of challenged restraints and
enhancing deterrence of those that create harm.10
To implement the quick look, courts and agencies must make a threshold
determination whether restraints that avoid per se condemnation are nonetheless
inherently suspect.11 If the answer is “no,” quick look analysis is over and
assignment clauses, whenever title had passed from the manufacturer to a wholesaler or dealer),
overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (banning horizontal maximum resale price
maintenance), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380–82 (evaluating nonprice vertical restraints before the Court
under the rule of reason because the manufacturer retained title to products distributed by its dealers).
Schwinn is a complicated case; the Court also condemned, as unlawful per se, nonprice vertical
restraints when title had passed, but here I am invoking a different portion of the opinion.
8. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing empirical evidence to this effect).
9. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (collecting examples of scholars who characterize the
traditional regime as dichotomous and advocate modification).
10. See infra notes 104–06, 139–46 and accompanying text (recounting proponents’ arguments in
favor of the quick look).
11. See infra Part III (detailing quick look methodology as implemented by agencies and courts).
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tribunals examine the restraint under the full-blown rule of reason. If the
restraint is inherently suspect, tribunals presume the agreement unlawful. Defendants must then explain how the restraint might produce “cognizable” benefits,
a standard indistinguishable from that for determining whether a proffered
virtue is redeeming in the per se context. This burden is one of articulation;
defendants need not offer evidence of such benefits. Failure to discharge this
burden results in condemnation of the restraint.
If defendants do articulate such benefits, tribunals move on to assess the
overall impact of the restraint. The methodology for assessment, however,
varies critically from that employed under the full-blown rule of reason. In
particular, tribunals evaluating inherently suspect restraints dispense with the
usual requirement that plaintiffs prove that a restraint produces harm, holding
instead that the mere existence of such a restraint establishes a prima facie case.
Thus, if a defendant offers no evidence that the restraint produces benefits, the
restraint is doomed, even though the plaintiff has not proved harm. If defendants do adduce evidence of benefits, tribunals compare the benefits with any
harm, asking whether the defendant could achieve such benefits by less restrictive means.
Courts and enforcement agencies have been employing the quick look for
nearly three decades, gaining substantial experience with how this modification
to the traditional dichotomous approach operates in practice. This experience
establishes that, if a restraint survives per se condemnation, the threshold
determination whether the agreement is inherently suspect is almost always
outcome determinative.12 If a tribunal determines that a restraint is not inherently suspect, it evaluates the agreement under the full-blown rule of reason,
which nearly all restraints survive. If a restraint is inherently suspect, tribunals
always condemn the restraint.
Support for the quick look is universal within the antitrust community:13
courts, enforcement agencies, and numerous scholars have endorsed the approach. Indeed, scholars with strong disagreements about important questions of
antitrust law and policy nonetheless come together to embrace the quick look.
These proponents claim that this revision of the traditional dichotomous approach is a win-win for antitrust regulation for three interrelated reasons. First,
the quick look supposedly reduces the costs that private plaintiffs, enforcement
agencies, and courts must incur when challenging and evaluating particularly
harmful restraints, thereby freeing up resources for use elsewhere. Second, this
approach allegedly encourages challenges by plaintiffs who might otherwise be
discouraged by the difficulty of prevailing under the full-blown rule of reason,
thus enhancing deterrence of harmful restraints. Third, by reducing the cost of
evaluating such restraints while still allowing defendants to offer justifications,

12. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (identifying judicial, executive, and scholarly support
for the quick look).
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the quick look purportedly enhances the accuracy of judicial and administrative
assessments of challenged restraints, furthering antitrust’s regulatory mission.
This Article takes issue with this consensus. Support for the quick look
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the cost of implementing this approach and the link between the standard for per se liability and quick look
analysis. Far from reducing enforcement and adjudication costs, the quick look
imposes an additional—and often costly—step on the traditional dichotomous
approach without producing any of the offsetting benefits touted by its
proponents.
Restraints do not announce themselves as inherently suspect. Instead, tribunals implementing the quick look must examine all restraints that survive per se
condemnation as an initial matter to determine whether such restraints are
inherently suspect or, instead, subject to full-blown analysis. Because the result
of this threshold evaluation is generally outcome determinative, plaintiffs and
defendants will rationally expend significant resources attempting to influence
the tribunal. In turn, tribunals will themselves often incur substantial costs
determining whether restraints are inherently suspect. To be sure, such examination is sometimes inexpensive, as courts draw upon experience teaching that
certain restraints merit full-blown scrutiny. However, the current definition of
inherently suspect is far from precise, leaving parties to speculate about the
status of many restraints. Such ambiguity increases the cost of this threshold
analysis in many cases because plaintiffs vigorously contend that a restraint is
inherently suspect while defendants vigorously contest this claim.
Of course, society should be willing to incur the additional costs required to
implement the quick look if such costs produce offsetting benefits, as its
proponents claim. This Article demonstrates that the private, administrative, and
judicial investments necessary to implement the quick look produce no offsetting benefits compared to the traditional dichotomous regime. To be precise, no
outcome of quick look analysis as currently practiced by courts and the enforcement agencies produces any of the benefits its proponents ascribe to it.
Plaintiffs’ diligent and perfectly rational efforts to convince courts that restraints are inherently suspect can produce one of two preliminary results. First,
tribunals can reject this argument, thereby ensuring that the challenged restraint
merits the same full-blown rule of reason treatment employed under the traditional dichotomous approach. Second, tribunals can conclude that a restraint is
inherently suspect, casting on defendants the burden of articulating some cognizable benefit the restraint might produce.
Neither result produces any benefits when compared to the traditional dichotomous approach. Experience shows that courts generally reject contentions that a
restraint is inherently suspect. In such cases, the investments necessary to
determine whether a restraint is inherently suspect are a waste, as such expenditures do not alter the ultimate methodology—full-blown analysis—for scrutinizing such restraints.
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When tribunals do declare restraints inherently suspect, they cast upon
defendants a burden to articulate cognizable benefits the restraint might create,
and failure to carry this burden dooms the restraint. Proponents of the quick
look emphasize that such condemnation consumes fewer resources than would
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny. However, any such benefits are entirely
illusory, insofar as a proper application of the per se rule would have condemned the restraint anyway. After all, a restraint that is inherently suspect will
reduce rivalry between the parties and thus be “pernicious” within the meaning
of the per se test. Moreover, a defendant’s inability to articulate a cognizable
benefit for the restraint necessarily establishes the absence of any redeeming
virtues, thereby requiring per se condemnation. Put another way, if courts
conduct per se analysis properly, the set of restraints that are both inherently
suspect and cannot produce cognizable benefits will be empty. Thus, the quick
look’s condemnation of such restraints does not reflect any improvement over
the traditional dichotomous approach.
What, though, about the second possible fate of restraints declared inherently
suspect—that is, cases in which defendants do satisfy their burden of articulating cognizable benefits the restraint might produce? In such cases, tribunals
assess the overall impact of the restraint, albeit without requiring the plaintiff to
offer any evidence of harm. This truncated approach reduces the cost of
condemning harmful restraints—conserving resources, enhancing accuracy, and
increasing deterrence—compared to a full-blown analysis.
In practice, however, any such benefits are again completely illusory. No
defendant has ever satisfied the burden of convincing a tribunal that an inherently suspect restraint may create cognizable benefits. Thus, courts and agencies
invariably condemn inherently suspect restraints without incurring any additional costs to assess their overall impact. Therefore, the supposed propensity of
the quick look to reduce the cost of such overall assessment produces no actual
benefits in the real world.
Engrafting the quick look onto the traditional dichotomous approach thus
increases the costs of enforcement and adjudication without producing any
offsetting benefits, whether in the form of reduced costs of enforcement and
adjudication, enhanced accuracy, or increased deterrence. These costs are themselves a deadweight social loss, consuming resources that could produce social
value elsewhere. Because defendants will bear some of these costs, the quick
look also functions as a tax on numerous forms of concerted action that survive
per se condemnation. This tax will induce some firms, at the margin, to abandon
agreements that tribunals might conceivably deem inherently suspect, even if
such agreements produce benefits for the parties and consumers compared to
alternatives. In other words, the quick look is currently a lose-lose that imposes
deadweight social losses and distorts underlying economic activity.
That the quick look distorts economic activity while it wastes private, administrative, and judicial resources does not thereby establish that the traditional
dichotomous system is the best we can construct. One can imagine two ways
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courts and agencies can alter the quick look so as to achieve its putative goals.
First, courts and agencies can better integrate per se and quick look analysis. In
particular, tribunals can defer any application of the quick look until they have
actually applied the Northern Pacific Railway test to a restraint—a step many
tribunals often skip. Rigorous application of this test will weed out restraints
that cannot produce redeeming virtues in the first place, thereby obviating the
need to determine if such restraints are inherently suspect. By deferring application of the inherently suspect test until after defendants have articulated plausible redeeming virtues, courts and agencies would avoid altogether the cost of
determining whether restraints that cannot create such virtues are inherently
suspect, when a cheaper determination that they are pernicious within the
meaning of the Northern Pacific Railway test would justify per se
condemnation.14
More rigorous application of the Northern Pacific Railway test would not,
however, improve upon the quick look as courts and agencies currently implement it. After all, if tribunals conduct per se analysis with greater care, courts
and agencies will only apply the inherently suspect inquiry to restraints that, by
definition, may produce redeeming virtues. However, as noted above, courts
have never identified any category of restraints that both may produce redeeming virtues and are inherently suspect. Thus, a quick look reformed in the way
described above would still require tribunals to incur the cost of discerning
whether certain restraints are inherently suspect without the prospect of discovering any such restraints.
The definition of inherently suspect is not immutable, however. This suggests
a second reform that, when combined with the first, may render the quick look a
useful modification of the dichotomous approach. That is, courts and agencies
could expand the definition of inherently suspect (as some have advocated) to
capture some restraints that properly survive per se condemnation because they
may produce redeeming virtues. Although deemed inherently suspect, such
restraints would avoid summary condemnation and merit additional consideration. Modified in this manner, the quick look could produce some benefits by
reducing the cost of establishing a prima facie case against such restraints.
Although theoretically attractive, this second modification appears unworkable. For one, the definition of inherently suspect articulated by courts and
agencies is vague at best, leaving firms and reformers alike to guess about the
definition’s current scope. Moreover, whereas scholars universally agree about
the desirability of the quick look, there is far less agreement about just how to
redefine the category of inherently suspect restraints. More to the point, no
scholar, jurist, or enforcement official has offered a more expansive definition of
inherently suspect that withstands scrutiny in light of basic antitrust principles
and modern economic theory.
14. Of course, if a restraint survives the per se test because it does not reduce rivalry and is thus not
pernicious, it cannot be inherently suspect.
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Part I of this Article describes the contours of the Sherman Act’s rule of
reason and the methodology of per se analysis. Part II describes how courts and
enforcement agencies conduct full-blown rule of reason analysis. Part III explains how the quick look alters the traditional dichotomous approach and
explores the rationale that the quick look’s proponents have offered in support
of this reform. Part IV critiques the quick look, demonstrating that engrafting
this methodology onto the traditional dichotomous approach increases the cost
of section 1 analysis without producing any offsetting benefits. Part IV also
explains how the quick look increases the expected costs of entering certain
beneficial agreements, thereby inducing some potential defendants to adopt less
efficient restraints. Part V explores possible adjustments to the quick look and
concludes that no such adjustments can improve upon the traditional dichotomous approach, if properly applied.
I. SECTION 1’S RULE OF REASON AND PER SE RULES
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids “[e]very contract, combination . . . ,
[and] conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade.”15 All contracts, however, restrain the
parties involved and thus operate to restrain trade—after all, that is the point of
contracts.16 Banning all agreements that literally “restrain trade” would grind
the economy to a halt, restraining trade more than any private agreement.17
From the beginning, then, the Supreme Court has tempered the statute’s plain
language to avoid these wealth-destroying effects. At first, the Court invoked its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and distinguished “direct” from “indirect”
restraints, holding that only the former violated the Act.18 In the landmark
Standard Oil decision, however, the Court embraced a different formulation that
survives to this day, holding that section 1 bans only unreasonable restraints,
leaving reasonable restraints outside of its scope.19 The Court emphasized the
common law origins of the term “restraint of trade” and that a broader construction of the Act would interfere with wealth-creating commerce and liberty of

15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
16. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.”); see
also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 13–14 (1981)
(explaining how enforcement of promises enhances private autonomy by facilitating cooperation);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 140–41 (China Soc. Scis. Publ’g 1978) (1960).
17. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[R]ead literally,
[section] 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law. Yet it is that body of law that
establishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets—indeed, a
competitive economy—to function effectively.”).
18. See United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (explaining that the Sherman
Act bans only direct restraints of interstate commerce and leaves “indirect” restraints, such as
agreements “entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or
corporation,” unscathed).
19. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58–60 (1911); see also United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–81 (1911) (approving Standard Oil and extending rule of reason to
section 2 of the Sherman Act).
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contract.20 Thus, the Court said, judges should examine restraints with “the light
of reason” to determine if they restrict competition “unduly”; that is, if they
result in higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality.21 This exclusive focus
on these economic variables and the invocation of reason implied that judicial
assessment of restraints could change over time as economic theory evolved.22
In fact, courts applying the rule of reason have often done just that: abandon
previous decisions because changed economic theory undermined the factual
premises of such rulings.23
Some early articulations of the rule of reason seemed to require wide-ranging
and fact-intensive analysis of every challenged restraint.24 However, courts
have never taken such an approach. Indeed, Standard Oil itself opined that
courts could condemn some restraints as unreasonable whenever “the nature or
character of the contract” established that the restraint was “unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions,” without any additional examination of the
restraint’s actual economic impact.25 A little reflection reveals the rationale of
such an approach. Litigation is expensive, in part because parties will invest
significant resources attempting to impose or avoid liability—resources that
could produce social value elsewhere.26 Moreover, judges, litigators, and juries
are not omniscient planners capable of making low-cost case-by-case assess-

20. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51, 63 (opining that literal application of the Act banning every
contract restraining trade “would be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any
respect whatever as to subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce”); see also Alan J. Meese,
Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 787–90 (2012).
21. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63–64; id. at 57 (explaining that the prohibition on restraints of
trade was aimed at conduct “producing or tending to produce the consequences of monopoly”); id. at 52
(listing the “evils” of monopoly as the power to fix prices, the power to limit output, and the danger of
deterioration in the quality of the monopolized product).
22. Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77,
89–92 (2003).
23. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (collecting various cases overruling prior decisions
because of evolving economic theory).
24. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 275 (4th ed. 2011) (“The problem with [Board of Trade of Chicago] is that it identifies the
haystack but not the needle.”); cf. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(stating that, to conduct rule of reason analysis, “the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable”; and that “[t]he history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts”).
25. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58; see also Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
211 (1959) (“[Standard Oil] emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints which from their
‘nature or character’ were unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the
statute.”).
26. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400–01 (1973) (recognizing that “direct costs” of litigation, such as the time of
“lawyers, litigants, witnesses, jurors, [and] judges,” as well as “paper and ink, law office and court
house maintenance, [and] telephone service,” are social costs); cf. infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text (explaining how rules assigning restraints to outcome-determinative categories will induce both
parties to invest resources to influence the tribunal).
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ments of the exact welfare consequences of a challenged restraint.27 As thenJudge Breyer once explained, antitrust rules are necessarily imperfect, given the
prohibitive administrative costs of perfection.28 In some cases, then, inflexible
rules that occasionally condemn some harmless restraints may nonetheless
improve society’s welfare by avoiding the social costs that parties, enforcers,
and courts would otherwise incur in a regime characterized by flexible case-bycase pursuit of perfection.29
During the 1950s, the Supreme Court implemented this logic by declaring
certain types or categories of agreements to be unreasonable per se, and thus
contrary to section 1, without regard to the actual economic impact of any
particular restraint in the category.30 Although sometimes attributed to Congress,31 the per se rule is better understood as an exercise of the Court’s
long-recognized authority to fashion common law rules that implement the
Sherman Act’s ban on restraints that, given their “nature or character,” produce
net economic harm.32 Courts exercised similar authority under the common law
that Standard Oil invoked, declining to enforce certain categories of restraints

27. See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 1909a, at 308 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that restraints subject to a full-blown rule of reason
analysis “are the most difficult and expensive to evaluate”).
28. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[W]hile
technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws cannot precisely replicate
the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views . . . . Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.”).
29. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶¶ 1910a–1910b, at 310–12 (explaining that per se rules reflect a
judgment that the costs of a full-blown rule of reason analysis often outweigh any corresponding
benefits); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
49, 83 (2007) (describing a “dilemma” between “[p]er se rules of illegality” that can be “vastly
overbroad” on the one hand, and “an open-ended rule of reason approach [that] would create excessive
litigation costs and uncertainty” on the other); see also Posner, supra note 26, at 401 (proceeding on the
assumption that legal systems should seek to minimize the sum of “direct costs” of enforcement and
litigation and the costs of adjudicatory error).
30. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused . . . .”); see also Klor’s, Inc., 359 U.S. at 211–12 (explaining that
there “were classes of restraints which from their ‘nature or character’ were unduly restrictive, and
hence forbidden” even when there were “allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances” (quoting Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65)).
31. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972).
32. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997) (discussing how the Sherman Act empowers
courts to revise the scope of per se rules in light of changed economic understandings); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (same); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (explaining that per se and rule of reason analysis are “two
complementary categories of antitrust analysis,” with each seeking “to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint”); see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55–58 (noting with
approval the evolution of common law banning restraints that were unreasonable because of their
“nature or character” regardless of economic impact).
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as unreasonable, without inquiring into their actual economic impact.33
The classic statement of the per se rule appeared in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States more than half a century ago:
Although [section 1’s ban on restraints of trade] is literally all-encompassing,
the courts have construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which “unreasonably” restrain competition. However, there are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.34

As the Supreme Court would confirm in subsequent cases, this language
created a two-part test pursuant to which courts will summarily condemn a
category of restraint if agreements in that category have a pernicious effect on
competition and, additionally, lack any redeeming virtue.35 Over the past several decades, the Court has repeatedly reiterated this test, sometimes employing
slightly different language when doing so.36 Thus, some opinions have substituted “manifestly anticompetitive” for “pernicious” in the first part of the test,
while retaining the requirement that a category of restraints that is “manifestly
anticompetitive” must also “lack . . . any redeeming virtues” before per se
condemnation is appropriate.37
Per se rules are not exceptions to the rule of reason but instead categorical
predictions, based on theory and experience, that full-blown rule of reason
33. For instance, courts refused to enforce “general” restraints—namely, covenants ancillary to the
sale of a business preventing the seller from subsequently doing business anywhere in the jurisdiction.
See Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 66–69 (1873) (describing and applying this rule);
Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1039–40 (Ill. 1901) (same). Courts also declined to
enforce restraints entered by utilities operating under state-granted franchises, regardless of the reasonableness of the agreement. See Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt. City, 130 U.S. 396, 408–12 (1889).
34. 356 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added) (first citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); then citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 1).
35. See infra note 36 (collecting numerous cases).
36. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (“To
justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have ‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects, and ‘lack . . . any
redeeming virtue.’” (alteration in original) (first quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 50 (1977); then quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289 (1985))); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (“Some types of restraints, however, have such
predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit,
that they are deemed unlawful per se.” (citing N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5)); Nw. Wholesale Stationers,
472 U.S. at 289 (certain agreements are unlawful per se “because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” (quoting N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5)); Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.9 (1980) (same); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (describing agreements or practices as being so “‘plainly anticompetitive’” and so
often ‘lack[ing] . . . any redeeming virtue’” as to merit per se condemnation (quoting N. Pac. Ry., 356
U.S. at 5)); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (same); Topco, 405 U.S. at 607 (1972) (quoting the Northern
Pacific Railway test in its entirety with approval).
37. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886–87 (first quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50; then quoting Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289).
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scrutiny of restraints in a particular class will always or almost always result in
a finding that such restraints are unreasonable.38 To be sure, like all rules, per se
rules are overinclusive, banning some harmless conduct.39 Fact-intensive rule of
reason scrutiny, if error free, would produce more accurate results, validating
some agreements categorized as unlawful per se either because they produce no
harm or result in virtues overlooked when conducting the more cursory per se
analysis. However, as noted earlier, courts are not omniscient, and such case-bycase consideration is not costless.40 According to the Supreme Court, per se
rules, although imperfect, conserve administrative costs and provide certainty to
regulated entities.41
Despite the Court’s repeated embrace of the Northern Pacific Railway test to
implement section 1, the second part of the test seems superfluous, or worse, in
light of the overall structure of Standard Oil’s rule of reason. After all, the Court
has repeatedly said that the rule of reason bans restraints that “destroy” competition, “unduly restrain” competition, “suppress” competition, or are “anticompetitive.”42 Moreover, Standard Oil held that courts must condemn any and all
contracts that unduly restrain competition by producing the sort of injury
condemned by the statute—reduced output or higher prices—without inquiring
into the “expediency or nonexpediency” of a contract producing such results or

38. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (“Per se treatment is appropriate ‘[o]nce experience with a particular
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)); Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289 (“[The] per se approach permits categorical judgments with
respect to certain business practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive.”); see also
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) (explaining that previous
decisions had “unequivocally foreclose[d] an interpretation of the [r]ule [of reason] as permitting an
inquiry into the reasonableness of the prices set by private agreement”); 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1509, at
440–48 (3d ed. 2011) (describing per se rules as reflecting determination of “class unreasonableness”).
39. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 442–44 (1990); Nw. Wholesale
Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289 (noting that per se rules can be overinclusive); Catalano, 446 U.S. at 649
(“[W]hen a particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no
apparent potentially redeeming value, the fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a particular
set of circumstances will not prevent its [sic] being declared unlawful per se.”).
40. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
41. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432 n.15 (explaining how the desire to
conserve administrative costs can justify per se rules despite their overinclusive nature); Sylvania, 433
U.S. at 50 n.16 (“[P]er se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the
burdens on litigants and the judicial system . . . .”); see also Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (holding that per se
treatment is appropriate “[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it” (alteration in original) (quoting
Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 344)).
42. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289–90 (stating that a category of restraints is
unlawful per se if contracts within the category are “predominantly anticompetitive”); Prof’l Eng’rs,
435 U.S. at 691 (explaining that a restraint that “suppresses competition” contravenes the rule of
reason); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (describing restraints that
“suppress or even destroy competition” as violating the rule of reason).
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the wisdom of Congress’s decision to condemn it.43 How is it, then, that a
category of restraint that has a pernicious effect on competition or is manifestly
anticompetitive, thus satisfying the first part of Northern Pacific Railway test,
can ever survive per se condemnation, as the test seems to contemplate? What
type of virtue could possibly redeem restraints that are, by hypothesis, pernicious or anticompetitive?
The solution to this quandary, which has important implications for the
interaction between per se analysis and the quick look, lies in the special
meaning of the term “competition” implicit in part one of Northern Pacific
Railway’s two-part test. To be sure, when antitrust courts or scholars refer to
competition they usually invoke a particular process of economic rivalry that
tends to maximize economic welfare by allocating resources to their highest and
best use.44 Defined in this way, real-world and socially useful competition
includes some contracts and other practices that restrain moment-by-moment
rivalry but enhance overall competition and economic welfare.45 As Justice
Brandeis put it nearly a century ago, contracts that “merely regulate” competition can further useful competition and economic welfare even though they
reduce rivalry between the parties to them.46 Other contracts, he said, can
“destroy” competition and thus reduce welfare.47 If by “pernicious effect on
competition” the Northern Pacific Railway Court meant “destructive of overall
competition,” then the second part of the decision’s per se test really would be
redundant.
There is, however, no such redundancy. Instead, any apparent inconsistency
between the Northern Pacific Railway test—which declines to condemn most
pernicious or manifestly anticompetitive restraints—and the rule of reason’s
43. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911); see also Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. at 354–55 (asserting that the argument that “competition” produces unreasonable results
should be directed to Congress); Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 690 (quoting Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65).
44. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (explaining that the
Sherman Act assumes that a free economy “best promotes the public weal” because “goods must stand
the cold test of competition [and] the public, acting through the market’s impersonal judgment, shall
allocate the Nation’s resources, and thus direct the course its economic development will take”);
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 1502, at 387–90 (discussing definition of competition relevant
for section 1’s rule of reason); see also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 44 (1959) (articulating and describing the goal of antitrust policy as the
“protection of competitive processes by limiting market power”).
45. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 92,
96–99 (3d ed. 1958) (suggesting that many activities that depart from atomistic competition are in fact
methods of achieving a more “competitive” result); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (explaining how “a restraint [on competition] in a limited aspect of a
market may actually enhance marketwide competition”); Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688 (explaining
how the enforceability of private agreements “enables competitive markets—indeed, a competitive
economy—to function effectively”); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir.
1985) (“Cooperation is the basis of productivity. . . . Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate
blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every
moment.”).
46. See Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
47. Id.
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well-established focus on competition is illusory and reflects the poverty of
antitrust language.48 To be precise, for purposes of the first part of the Northern
Pacific Railway test, the term “competition” does not refer to any well-defined
economic process or the overall impact of a restraint on market price or
output.49 Instead, competition in this context refers to atomistic rivalry between
two or more firms, unrestrained by any agreement between them and without
regard to the economic impact of such rivalry. Under the first part of the
Northern Pacific Railway test, then, a restraint has a pernicious effect on
competition if it restricts or eliminates unbridled rivalry on price, output, or
some other economic variable.50 Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that agreements restricting rivalry on one or more terms of trade have the
requisite effect on competition to merit per se condemnation regardless of
market structure or any other indicator that the restriction can produce harm.51
Therefore, when applying the first part of the per se test, courts do not assess
whether restraints in the category in question are “anticompetitive” as a whole.
Instead, courts must focus only on the rivalry-reducing properties of the class of
restraints, ignoring any consideration of possible efficiency impacts. Application of this part of the per se test is quite simple and relatively cheap. Given this
expansive and literalistic definition of competition, many beneficial restraints
could have a pernicious effect on competition and thus fail the first part of the
Northern Pacific Railway test. The formation of a partnership, for instance,
eliminates actual or potential rivalry between previously independent firms.52
So do restraints ancillary to such partnerships, such as provisions that prevent
partners from “moonlighting” in competition with the enterprise.53 The same
applies for horizontal mergers, many joint ventures, covenants ancillary to the
sale of a business, vertical restraints, or restraints ancillary to a legitimate joint
venture, all of which eliminate rivalry that would otherwise occur.54 In short,

48. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 277 (“‘[C]ompetition’ has been used in antitrust cases to mean
several different things.”).
49. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57–59 (1911) (holding that restraints are
unreasonable if they unduly restrain competition by reducing market output or increasing market price).
50. See Meese, supra note 22, at 94–95 (describing case law defining “anticompetitive” within the
meaning of the first part of the per se test in this way).
51. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
212 (1959) (declaring restraint unlawful per se despite uncontradicted proof that it did not impact price,
output, or quality).
52. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 356–57 (explaining that price fixing between
partners is “perfectly proper”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9
(1979) (“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally ‘price
fixing’. . . .”).
53. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (6th Cir. 1898) (endorsing the
common law’s favorable treatment of such restraints).
54. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (noting that price setting by a joint venture may be
“price fixing in a literal sense” but not unlawful per se); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23 (“Mergers
among competitors eliminate competition, including price competition . . . .”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (describing how nonprice vertical restraints reduce intrabrand
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parties challenging the validity of restraints can generally satisfy the first part of
the Northern Pacific Railway test with ease.
How, then, can any rational test that purports to implement the rule of reason
treat these transactions or restraints as pernicious? The answer lies in the second
part of the Northern Pacific Railway test. Far from being superfluous, the
second part of the test does most of the work.55 That is, once a tribunal
determines that a restraint has a pernicious effect on competition so defined, as
so many restraints do, it must then move to the second part of the test and
evaluate any possible redeeming virtues that defendants offer in favor of such
restraints.56 Put another way, courts must ask whether the potential benefits that
defendants identify are cognizable or redeeming, in light of policies inherent in
the rule of reason. More precisely, courts ask whether the restraint may “fructify” or “develop” trade by creating technological efficiencies or overcoming a
market failure.57 If the defendants do identify such cognizable benefits, then the
restraint, no matter how pernicious, survives per se condemnation and merits
rule of reason scrutiny.58 If the defendants do not identify such benefits, then it
makes sense to interpret the rivalry-reducing arrangement—which the defendants spent time and other resources adopting, enforcing, and defending—as an
effort to acquire or exercise market power.59

competition); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
restraints ancillary to joint ventures reduce horizontal rivalry as much as naked restraints subject to per
se condemnation).
55. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Commentary, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing
Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 172–73 (1988); Meese, supra note 22, at 97; see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 277 (“[T]he label ‘illegal per se’ entails that certain justifications or
defenses will not be permitted.”); Richard A. Givens, Affirmative Benefits of Industrial Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 IND. L.J. 51, 52 (1960) (concluding that mergers are “far more
competition-destroying” than other restraints that reduce competition but nonetheless avoid per se
condemnation because they may produce redeeming virtues).
56. See Krattenmaker, supra note 55, at 172–73 (“What the Court means to say [when it declares a
practice unlawful per se] is that certain defenses or justifications frequently offered for price fixing (or
group boycotts, or tying arrangements) are to be summarily rejected, without factual inquiry, either as a
matter of principle or because experience teaches us that the costs of the inquiry will exceed any
potential gains. No conduct is per se (that is, ‘by itself’ or ‘intrinsically’) a violation of the antitrust
laws. However, certain defenses to such conduct are per se inadmissible or impermissible.” (citations
omitted)).
57. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55–56 (1911) (explaining that acts that
“tended to fructify and develop trade” were, for that reason, reasonable); Meese, supra note 22, at
95–98.
58. See Krattenmaker, supra note 55, at 171–72 (explaining how identification of a valid redeeming
virtue that restraint might produce obviates per se condemnation).
59. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) (“Very few firms
that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices.
Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 269
(1978))); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (holding that the
defendant’s claim that restraint would reduce price competition and thereby enhance public safety did
not describe a cognizable benefit but instead depended upon the assumption that the restraint would
raise prices and thus have an anticompetitive effect); Meese, supra note 22, at 98 n.100 (collecting
cases and scholarly authorities endorsing per se condemnation of such restraints on this basis); see also
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Partnerships, mergers, and ancillary restraints all reduce or eliminate competition, defined as rivalry between the parties to such agreements, and thus have
the pernicious effect that satisfies the first part of the Northern Pacific Railway
test.60 Still, courts have never treated any such restraints as unlawful per se,
recognizing that each might also produce redeeming virtues by producing
technological efficiencies or overcoming a market failure.61 Partnerships, joint
ventures, or mergers, for instance, integrate previously separate assets and
human capital and may lead to more efficient production or product improvement.62 Restraints ancillary to such ventures can help magnify these efficiencies
by preventing the sort of market failures that would result if venture participants
were free to compete in any way they wished with the venture.63 Finally, the
classic ancillary restraint, the covenant ancillary to the sale of a business, allows
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1980) (rejecting virtues proffered by the
defendants as noncognizable and thus declaring challenged practice unlawful per se).
60. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text; see also Krattenmaker, supra note 55, at 172
(noting that formation of a law firm is literally “price fixing”). It should be noted that some restraints
survive per se condemnation at least in part because they do not produce pernicious effects on the sort
of “competition” relevant under the Northern Pacific Railway test. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 18 (1997) (rejecting per se ban on maximum price fixing because such agreements often reduce
prices with the result that “the potential injuries [attributed to such restraints are] less serious than the
Court [previously] imagined”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23–24
(1979) (finding that restraint was not pernicious in part because it left sellers free to bargain separately
with buyers); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20–23 (explaining that the challenged practice also might
produce significant cognizable benefits).
61. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 & n.1 (2006); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (explaining that price fixing between partners is “perfectly proper”
despite the resulting elimination of price competition); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9 (price fixing
by two partners is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23 (“Not
all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price are per se
violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate
competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal . . . .”); Broad. Music, Inc., 441
U.S. at 20–23 (rejecting application of per se rule to a practice that was literally price fixing because the
practice accompanied other forms of integration and “substantial lowering of costs” of distributing
products governed by the arrangement); see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963) (refusing to declare vertically imposed exclusive territories that reduce competition unlawful per
se because of lack of information about possible redeeming virtues); Krattenmaker, supra note 55, at
172 (“[W]hen [the Supreme Court says] that not all literal price fixing is illegal per se, [it] mean[s] that
once a plaintiff has proved that price fixing has occurred, the defendant nevertheless may escape
liability by proving certain facts . . . . Thus, lawyers do not necessarily violate the Sherman Act when
they form a law firm and doctors who cooperate to establish clinics are not necessarily antitrust felons.”
(citations omitted)); supra text accompanying notes 57–58 (detailing standards courts apply when
determining whether purported virtues are cognizable).
62. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898); see also Dagher,
547 U.S. at 6–8; Givens, supra note 55, at 52–53 (explaining that mergers, while eliminating
competition, avoid per se condemnation because they may produce cognizable benefits).
63. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 (“Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business
activity of the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise . . . were
[at common law] to be encouraged.”); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 381–84 (1966) (explaining how such agreements
can prevent individual partners from free riding on the partnership’s efforts and thus encourage
investments and specialization by the enterprise); see also Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d
185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining how a covenant ancillary to the formation of a shopping center
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sellers of a business to convey the entire goodwill associated with it to a
purchaser, thereby ensuring that the original owner of the business can realize,
via a high sale price, the full benefits of his or her efforts to expand and improve
the business.64
At the same time, many restraints with the same pernicious effect—complete
elimination of rivalry—fall prey to the per se test because tribunals reject
purported virtues adduced by defendants as not redeeming.65 For instance,
courts and agencies will condemn as unlawful per se horizontal price fixing if
proponents of the restraint merely claim that the agreement will set a reasonable
price because the propensity to set such a price is not a redeeming virtue.66
Similar logic applies to horizontal agreements on nonprice terms of trade.67
Courts have also rejected an effort to justify horizontal price fixing as a means
of encouraging nonprice competition.68 The outcome of per se analysis, then,
almost always turns on the application of the second part of the Northern
Pacific Railway test, as courts and agencies determine whether potential virtues
that defendants ascribe to a given category of restraint are in fact redeeming.69
The list of restraints deemed unlawful per se has not been static. Initially,
courts condemned few restraints outright, subjecting even some price fixing to
something like rule of reason scrutiny.70 Subsequently, during antitrust’s inhospi-

could encourage venture partners to engage in promotion and thus enhance the productivity of the
venture).
64. See Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689 (explaining that courts will sustain such covenants even
though they reduce competition because “[t]he long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the
business itself—and thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise—outweighed the
temporary and limited loss of competition”); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF
TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 252 (1986); Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand
Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 600–01 (2004).
65. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (rejecting proffered redeeming
virtues and therefore declaring horizontal agreement on credit terms unlawful per se); Prof’l Eng’rs,
435 U.S. at 692–96 (rejecting proffered redeeming virtues and declaring collective ban on competitive
bidding unlawful); Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 352–55; United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 610–12 (1972) (condemning horizontal agreement between rivals as unlawful per se after
rejecting defendants’ assertion that the restraint’s propensity to enhance interbrand competition was a
redeeming virtue); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (explaining that both naked and ancillary restraints can
equally restrain competition but that the latter avoid per se condemnation because they may produce
significant benefits).
66. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (“[I]t is no excuse that
the prices fixed are themselves reasonable.”); Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689 (“[Addyston Pipe], and
subsequent decisions by this Court, unequivocally foreclose an interpretation of the Rule as permitting
an inquiry into the reasonableness of the prices set by private agreement.”); see also Krattenmaker,
supra note 55, at 172–73 (explaining how rejection of reasonable price defense leads to per se
condemnation of price fixing not supported by other redeeming virtues).
67. See Catalano, 446 U.S. at 648–50 (rejecting the contention that propensity of agreement on
credit terms to enhance visibility of price competition was a redeeming virtue).
68. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 675 (3d Cir. 1993).
69. See Meese, supra note 22, at 95–96.
70. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428–29 (1920) (subjecting tying agreements to a forgiving rule of
reason), overruled in part by FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
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tality era71—roughly 1950 through 1977—the Supreme Court continually expanded the number of per se rules, banning practices like nonprice vertical
restraints that were previously analyzed under the rule of reason.72 Although
often attributed to populist impulses, such decisions also reflected the era’s
mainstream economic theory, which simply excluded the possibility that such
restraints could, despite reducing competition, actually enhance economic
welfare.73
More recently, the Supreme Court, bound to evaluate restraints with the light
of reason and thus according to evolving economic theory, has reversed itself.74
This reversal followed a paradigm shift in economic theory, known as “transaction cost economics,” which concluded that nonstandard agreements could
sometimes overcome market failures, increase economic output, and thus produce redeeming virtues that courts previously overlooked.75 As a result, numerous restraints once deemed unlawful per se because they reduce rivalry without
possible benefits are now analyzed under the rule of reason.76 Today the vast
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 245 (1899) (condemning horizontal price fixing as a “direct restraint”
after determining that cartel set unreasonable prices).
71. See Meese, supra note 22, at 124–25 (describing antitrust’s inhospitality era); Meese, supra note
22, at 119–24 (describing neoclassical price theory’s strong preference for atomistic competition during
this period); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705,
715 (1982) (“[The] ‘inhospitality tradition of antitrust’ . . . called for courts to strike down business
practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition an inference of monopolization followed
from the courts’ inability to grasp how a practice might be consistent with substantial competition.”).
The phrase “inhospitality tradition” was apparently coined by Professor Donald Turner, an economist
who headed the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in the 1960s. According to Turner, “I
approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.” Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST.
B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 1–2.
72. See Meese, supra note 22, at 124–34 (describing doctrinal developments during the inhospitality
era); supra note 6, at 103. But see, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)
(rejecting application of per se rule to nonprice vertical restraints); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847,
849 (6th Cir. 1964) (analyzing vertically imposed exclusive territories under a full-blown rule of
reason). Although the Court confined the per se rule against tying to agreements by firms with
“economic power,” it found such power in any departure from perfect competition. See Fortner, 394
U.S. at 502–03 (the mere existence of a tie is itself evidence that the defendant possesses sufficient
“economic power”); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (possession of a copyright
creates a presumption of economic power), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006).
73. See Meese, supra note 22, at 115–23; see also Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard
Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
22 (2005) (explaining how the foundational perfect competition model precluded recognition of
beneficial explanations for various non-standard agreements).
74. See Meese, supra note 22, at 141–44 (discussing various Supreme Court decisions repudiating
case law from the inhospitality era); see also infra note 76.
75. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for
Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 472, 475–76 (2010); Oliver E.
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 273–74 (1987) (describing transaction cost economics as a “paradigm shift” in thinking about both complete and partial contractual integration).
76. See Meese, supra note 22, at 134–41; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–907 (2007) (overturning a ninety-five-year ban on minimum resale price
maintenance because developments in economic theory established that such restraints may in some
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majority of trade restraints avoid per se condemnation and are thus subject to
analysis under a more fact-intensive rule of reason.77
II. THE “FULL-BLOWN” RULE OF REASON
As noted above, courts banned numerous restraints as unlawful per se during
antitrust’s three decade inhospitality era.78 During this period, the standards
governing rule of reason analysis received short shrift; no Supreme Court
decision discussed how to conduct such analysis.79 Beginning in 1977, however, numerous practices once deemed unlawful per se became subject to
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny.80
The Supreme Court has declined to articulate a comprehensive methodology
for conducting full-blown rule of reason analysis, leaving lower courts and
enforcement agencies to fill in the gaps and articulate the precise standards
governing this analysis.81 Under the consensus approach, plaintiffs challenging
such restraints can only prevail if they establish that an agreement produces
actual economic harm that outweighs any benefits the restraint produces.82 The
basic contours of this test are uncontroversial. First, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of harm.83 If the plaintiff fails to adduce such evidence, the
case is over.84 Second, if the plaintiff establishes such a case, the defendant

cases produce redeeming virtues); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–22 (1997) (overruling prior
decision banning maximum resale price maintenance as unlawful per se); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (holding that horizontal price restraint was
properly analyzed under the rule of reason); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 passim
(1977) (reversing ban on nonprice vertical restraints because of revised economic understanding of
such agreements). See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:
The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 749 (2012) (stating that, taken
together, Broad. Music, Inc. and Sylvania “restored comprehensive rule of reason analysis as the default
setting for antitrust analysis and repositioned the per se rule as an exception”).
77. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (referring to the “narrow category of activity
that is per se unlawful”).
78. See Meese, supra note 22, at 124–34 (describing doctrinal developments during the inhospitality
era); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (collecting various decisions).
79. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Co., 394 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1969) (declining to consider
whether plaintiff could prevail under the rule of reason, given the possibility of per se liability).
80. See supra note 76 (collecting authorities).
81. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506–07 (2d Cir. 2004)
(articulating comprehensive rule of reason methodology); see also Meese, supra note 22, at 98–99
(discussing Supreme Court precedent determining certain aspects of rule of reason analysis and hinting
at others).
82. Meese, supra note 22, at 98–99.
83. See Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Applying the rule of reason,
we first look to see ‘whether [the] FTC has demonstrated ‘actual detrimental effects’ or ‘the potential
for genuine adverse effects on competition [via proof of market power].’” (first alteration in original)
(quoting In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 469 (1992))); Geneva Pharm., 386 F.3d at
506–07 (“[T]he plaintiffs bear an initial burden to demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior
‘had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.’” (quoting Capital
Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537 (1993))).
84. See E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming
dismissal of section 1 complaint because the plaintiff did not allege market-wide harm).
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must come forward with actual evidence, and not just argument, that the
restraint produces redeeming virtues.85 Failure to produce such evidence at this
stage dooms the restraint, given the plaintiff’s proof of harm.86 Third, if the
defendant does produce such evidence, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. At
this point, the plaintiff may simply rest on the evidence it has presented, leaving
the trier of fact to compare any evidence of harm with the defendant’s evidence
of benefits and to determine which predominates.87 The plaintiff may also
attempt to establish that there is a less restrictive means of achieving the same
benefits produced by the restraint.88 These two approaches are not, it should be
noted, mutually exclusive: a plaintiff may argue that there is a less restrictive
means of achieving such benefits and that, in any event, the restraint produces
harms that outweigh any benefits.89
There is less consensus, however, about how to implement this test, particularly the first stage. All courts agree that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case if it proves that the defendant possesses market power of the sort necessary
to produce the type of harm the plaintiff alleges.90 Most also hold that, failing
such proof, plaintiffs may also prevail by establishing that the restraint produces
“actual detrimental effects,” that is, prices that are higher or output that is lower
than would have prevailed without the restraint.91 Some courts, however, reject
this “actual detrimental effects” test, holding that definition of a relevant market
and proof of market power is necessary for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case.92

85. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 834 (explaining that defendant can prevail despite showing of
actual adverse effect by offering evidence of some offsetting procompetitive benefits); Geneva Pharm.,
386 F.3d at 507 (“If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendants to offer
evidence of the pro-competitive effects of their agreement.”).
86. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 834–36 (explaining that failure to produce evidence of such
benefits after plaintiff established prima facie case resulted in judgment for the plaintiff).
87. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he harms and benefits must be
weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance,
reasonable.”).
88. See Geneva Pharm., 386 F.3d at 507 (“Assuming defendants can provide such proof, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove that any legitimate competitive benefits offered by defendants could
have been achieved through less restrictive means.”).
89. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1268–69.
90. Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 826–29 (proof of market power or actual detrimental effects are
alternative means of establishing a prima facie case); Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20 (same).
91. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 831–34; Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20; see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (rejecting defendants’ contention that proof of market power
was necessary to establish prima facie case given the FTC’s findings that the restraint produced
anti-competitive harm); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)
(holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case given the district court‘s finding that price
was higher and output lower than it would have been absent the restraint).
92. See Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Reason is market power, without which the practice
cannot cause those injuries (lower output and the associated welfare losses) that matter under the
federal antitrust laws.”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.
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Plaintiffs almost never prevail in a full-blown rule of reason case. Most
importantly, proof of a prima facie case, whether through proof of market power
or actual detrimental effects, is difficult. Indeed, one recent study of all rule of
reason cases decided between early 1999 and mid-2009 concluded that ninetyseven percent of such cases fail at this first stage because plaintiffs cannot
establish a prima facie case of harm.93 This result was consistent with the result
the same author obtained after studying several hundred rule of reason cases
decided between 1977 and 1998.94 Also, in that small subset of cases in which
plaintiffs do establish harm and thus a prima facie case, defendants nonetheless
prove benefits that outweigh harms in most such cases.95 The more recent of
these two studies found that plaintiffs prevailed in about one percent of fullblown rule of reason cases.96
III. A “QUICK LOOK” FOR INHERENTLY SUSPECT RESTRAINTS
As described thus far, section 1 analysis has an “all or nothing” quality to it.
In short, the determination of whether a restraint is unlawful per se is generally
outcome determinative. After all, restraints falling into the per se category are
automatically unlawful regardless of actual harm. By contrast, restraints subject
to the full-blown rule of reason almost always survive scrutiny. Moreover,
because the Supreme Court has significantly contracted the number of per se
rules, the vast majority of agreements subject to section 1 fall into the second
category.97
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that enforcement agencies, courts, and scholars
have all proposed what they characterize as a middle ground between per se
condemnation on the one hand, and full-blown rule of reason scrutiny on the
other. 98 Proponents of the middle ground approach seek to improve upon
Cir. 1986) (“A monopolist . . . enhances its revenues by raising the market price. It can do that only if
its share of the market is so large that by reducing its output of goods or services the amount offered by
the industry is substantially reduced so that the price is bid up.”); see also United States v. VISA
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that proof of a relevant market and market
power are necessary to establish a prima facie case under the rule of reason).
93. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009). It should be noted that this study excluded applications of the quick
look, limiting itself to instances in which the “full-blown” rule of reason applied. See id. at 828 (noting
this limitation).
94. See Carrier, supra note 89, at 1293 (finding that eighty-four percent of full-blown rule of reason
cases failed during this prior period because plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case); id.
(reproducing data suggesting that defendants prevailed in more than ninety percent of full-blown rule of
reason cases).
95. See Carrier, supra note 93, at 831–32 (finding that defendants prevailed in most cases in which
they adduced proof of benefits).
96. See id. at 830 (“In 221 of 222 cases (all except a single balancing case), the defendant won.”).
97. See id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J.
305, 305 (1987) (opining that rejection of per se condemnation in favor of full-blown rule of reason
treatment “as a practical matter meant that [the challenged restraints] were declared lawful per se”).
98. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1909a, at 308 (describing restraints that are “in the middle”
between those deemed unlawful per se and those meriting full-blown rule of reason scrutiny).
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traditional section 1 analysis, which many unflatteringly characterize as “dichotomous” or “bipolar.”99 In particular, these scholars, jurists, and enforcement
officials advocate a third category of section 1 analysis reserved for restraints
that, though not unlawful per se, are inherently suspect.100 Whether dubbed
“quick look,”101 the “truncated rule of reason,”102 or “stepwise analysis,”103 this
alternative seeks to reduce the cost and increase the accuracy of the analysis for
those restraints that escape per se condemnation but nonetheless pose a significant risk of competitive harm.
Although first employed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), several
courts of appeals have endorsed the approach, and the Supreme Court has
agreed, albeit in dicta.104 The Department of Justice has, in joint guidelines with
99. Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (referring to the traditional
approach as “a dichotomous categorical approach”); Peter C. Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se
Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A [Re]conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic
Organizations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 420 (2000) (referring to the “dichotomous structure required
by a formal doctrine” governing section 1 analysis); Gavil, supra note 76, at 762 (referring to the
traditional approach as “bipolar”); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1217 (2008) (referring to “the strict dichotomous
categories of per se and Rule of Reason analysis”); Timothy J. Muris, The Rule of Reason After
California Dental, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 531 (2001) (referring to the traditional “rigid, bipolar
approach”); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 283, 295 n.52 (2001) (noting the tension between treating per se unlawful and full-blown
rule of reason categories as “dichotomous choices” and a “sliding scale” approach).
100. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1909a, at 307–08 (describing with approval so-called tripartite
analysis under which restraints “are subjected to three modes of analysis” under section 1).
101. See Gavil, supra note 76, at 753–59 (discussing evolution of the so-called quick look rule of
reason).
102. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 285 (referring to “[t]he Truncated or ‘Quick Look,’ Rule of
Reason”).
103. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, A Stepwise Approach to
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address Before the American Bar Association’s Antitrust
Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program 4–5 (Nov. 7, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/file/518656/download).
104. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013). Some, including the enforcement
agencies and the Supreme Court, have attributed the quick look to NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986). See Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (claiming that the Supreme Court
employed a quick look approach in both Indiana Federation of Dentists and NCAA); Polygram, 416
F.3d at 35 (same); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.3, at 10–11 nn.27–28 (2000).
In my view, these scholars, jurists, and enforcement officials have misread both Indiana Federation
of Dentists and NCAA. In NCAA, for instance, the Court began its rule of reason analysis by recounting
and affirming the district court’s findings that the challenged restraint produced significant anticompetitive harm in the form of higher prices and reduced output. 468 U.S. at 104–08. I therefore agree with
the late Professor Areeda that NCAA rested upon the Court’s belief that the challenged restraint
produced actual anticompetitive harm and thus does not stand for the proposition that the mere
existence of a restraint can suffice to establish a prima facie case. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1511, at 430–33 (1986). In Indiana
Federation of Dentists, the Court invoked the FTC’s findings that the challenged restraint had produced
actual anticompetitive effects. See 476 U.S. at 461 (“In this case, we conclude that the finding of actual,
sustained adverse effects on competition in those areas where IFD dentists predominated, viewed in
light of the reality that markets for dental services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to
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the FTC, also endorsed this methodology.105 Numerous leading antitrust scholars have as well, although there is disagreement about how to apply the
approach.106
The quick look framework is easy to explain, if sometimes difficult to apply.
Of course, the framework only applies as a logical matter to restraints that
survive per se condemnation, presumably after application of the Northern
Pacific Railway test and a determination that a restraint might produce redeeming virtues.107 In its most rigorous form, the quick look entails up to four steps
for analyzing such restraints.108
First, the tribunal decides whether the agreement, although not unlawful per se, is
nonetheless “inherently suspect.”109 This determination is purely theoretical—a
question of law for the tribunal—and does not require any proof that the
restraint actually produces harm.110 If the tribunal determines that the restraint
is not inherently suspect, then quick look analysis is over and the tribunal
subjects the restraint to the sort of full-blown rule of reason analysis described
earlier.111 This default to the full-blown rule of reason follows naturally from
the fact that such restraints avoided per se condemnation, presumably because
they might produce redeeming virtues.112

support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)). Hence, both
NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists were straightforward applications of the full-blown rule of
reason.
105. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, § 3.3, at 10–11.
106. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911, at 324–31 (discussing “truncated” rule of reason inquiry
and quick look with approval); HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 285–87; LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN &
WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 248–49 (2d ed. 2006) (endorsing position that “truncated
analysis is still appropriate when conduct is presumptively anticompetitive”); Edward D. Cavanagh,
The Rule of Reason Re-examined, 67 BUS. LAW. 435, 466–67 (2012); Gavil, supra note 76, at 766–73;
Timothy J. Muris & Brady P.P. Cummins, Tools of Reason: Truncation Through Judicial Experience
and Economic Learning, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 46, 46; see also supra note 99 (citing other
authors endorsing quick look in various contexts).
107. See supra notes 55–69 and accompanying text (explaining that application of Northern Pacific
Railway test turns on possible presence (or not) of redeeming virtues).
108. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 466–67 (describing four-step approach); Crane, supra note 29, at
63 (same); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35–36 (describing and endorsing four-step approach (citing In re
Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988))); Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604
(“This structure is readily described as a series of questions to be answered in turn.”); see also N. Tex.
Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 358–61 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing the FTC’s framework).
109. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35–36; Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604.
110. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d at 363–67 (affirming FTC’s finding that restraint was
inherently suspect despite absence of evidence that restraint impacted price or output); Polygram, 416
F.3d at 35–36 (same); Mass. Bd., 110 F. T. C. at 604 (same); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 27,
¶ 1909b (explaining that the determination whether a restraint is unlawful per se or inherently suspect is
a question of law for the tribunal).
111. Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604 (“If the restraint is not inherently suspect, then the traditional rule
of reason, with attendant issues of market definition and power, must be employed.”); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911, at 326–27 (determination that restraint is not inherently suspect
results in full-blown rule of reason inquiry).
112. See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.
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Second, if the restraint is inherently suspect, the defendant must articulate a
plausible and legally cognizable competitive justification for the agreement.113
The standards governing cognizability, it should be noted, are the same as those
governing whether a purported virtue is redeeming for purposes of applying the
Northern Pacific Railway test for per se illegality.114 Here again, the analysis is
purely theoretical, with the tribunal assuming for the sake of argument that the
restraint will produce the benefits in question and asking whether, as a matter of
law, such benefits are cognizable.115 If the defendant fails to satisfy this burden
of articulation, the tribunal condemns the restraint, without moving to the third
step and without any proof of actual harm.116
Third, if the defendant does explain how the restraint might produce cognizable benefits, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who may discharge the
resulting burden in one of two ways.117 First, the plaintiff can decline to
introduce additional evidence, relying instead upon a purely theoretical explanation of how the restraint “very likely harmed consumers.”118 Second, the
plaintiff may adduce actual evidence that the restraint likely produces harm, that
is, the same sort of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case under the
full-blown rule of reason.119 Indeed, the FTC’s initial formulation of the test
treated the first avenue as the exclusive means of discharging the plaintiff’s

113. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 36 (explaining that at step two, the defendant must come “forward
with some plausible (and legally cognizable) competitive justification for the restraint”); Mass. Bd., 110
F.T.C. at 604 (“[W]e must pose a second question: Is there a plausible efficiency justification for the
practice? That is, does the practice seem capable of creating or enhancing competition (e.g., by
reducing the costs of producing or marketing the product, creating a new product, or improving the
operation of the market)?”); see also Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 466–67.
114. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (explaining that per
se and rule of reason analyses are “complementary categories,” both of which require tribunals to form
a judgment “about the competitive significance of the restraint”); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010,
1021–22 (1998) (citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990)) (rejecting
as noncognizable the social welfare benefits that the defendant offered to prove during rule of reason
analysis); see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (holding that the
presence of “redeeming virtues” is implicit in judicial decisions sustaining challenged restraints under
the full-blown rule of reason); HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 286 (“The purpose [of the quick look] is
not to broaden the range of defenses for a restraint that is conceded to reduce output or increase
price.”).
115. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1909b, at 308–09; cf. Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–96
(assuming, for the sake of argument, that the challenged restraint would enhance public safety as
defendants claimed but holding that such benefits were not cognizable); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37–38
(assuming that the challenged restraint would reduce interbrand free riding but holding that this effect
was not a cognizable benefit under step two of quick look analysis).
116. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 368–70 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
justification offered by the defendant was not cognizable and thus condemning the restraint at step
two); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37–38 (same); Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 606–08 (same).
117. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35–36 (articulating this portion of the test); see also Mass. Bd., 110
F.T.C. at 604 (same).
118. Polygram, 416 F.3d at 36.
119. See id.
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burden at this third stage.120 The first approach follows naturally from the
rationale of the quick look in that it dispenses with costly proof that is
superfluous, given the threshold determination that the restraint is such that it
most likely produces harm.121 Moreover, as explained below, courts and the
enforcement agencies define restraints as inherently suspect because they pose
exceptional risks of anticompetitive harm.122 As a result, all restraints deemed
inherently suspect will also appear likely to have harmed consumers and thus
establish a prima facie case based upon the mere existence of the (inherently
suspect) restraint.123 Indeed, one scholar has aptly opined that “[t]he defining
characteristic of the quick look . . . is its ability to shift a burden from the
plaintiffs to the defendants without ‘elaborate industry analysis.’”124
Fourth, if the plaintiff satisfies this (light) burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who may discharge it by proving either that the restraint does not in
fact produce harm or, in the alternative, that the restraint produces benefits that
outweigh any harm.125 This latter showing is subject to the plaintiff’s ability to
offer a less restrictive alternative, as is the case with full-blown rule of reason
analysis.126
There is significant overlap between the quick look methodology and traditional full-blown rule of reason analysis. Under both methodologies, for instance, courts balance any benefits against harms if plaintiffs establish a prima
facie case.127 Moreover, such balancing is subject to a less restrictive alternative
test under both approaches.128
120. See Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604. Thus, the government would only have to establish actual
harm after the defendant proved that the restraint produces benefits because “if . . . the justification is
really valid . . . . it must be assessed under the full balancing test of the Rule of Reason.” Id.
121. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, § 3.1 (“Rule of reason
analysis focuses on only those factors, and undertakes only the degree of factual inquiry, necessary to
assess accurately the overall competitive effect of the relevant agreement.” (first citing Cal. Dental
Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778–81 (1999); then citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
459–61 (1986); and then citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104–13
(1984))).
122. See infra notes 130–38 and accompanying text.
123. See Muris & Cummins, supra note 106, at 46 (describing and endorsing truncated analysis
whereby “the plaintiff seeks to avoid pleading and proving market power” (quoting In re Polygram, 136
F.T.C. 310, 344 n.37 (2003) (Muris, Chairman))).
124. See Gavil, supra note 76, at 777 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
125. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that
tribunal must assess the “net procompetitive effect[s]” of an inherently suspect restraint if the defendant
proves that the restraint produces cognizable benefits); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 36 (“[T]he evidentiary
burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint in fact does not harm consumers or has ‘procompetitive virtues’ that outweigh its burden upon consumers.”); Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604 (explaining that,
once defendant shows that an inherently suspect restraint produces benefits, the tribunal must apply the
“full balancing test of the rule of reason”).
126. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 287; Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 467; cf. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 24, at 280 (explaining the role of less restrictive alternatives in ordinary rule of reason
analysis).
127. See Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 467.
128. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 280, 287.
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There are, however, two main distinctions between the two methodologies.
First, the quick look adds an additional layer of analysis—a “filter”—by asking
whether each restraint that survives per se condemnation is nonetheless inherently suspect before proceeding to further analysis. Second, if a tribunal does
determine that a restraint is inherently suspect, then the plaintiff may establish a
prima facie case without adducing the slightest evidence of harm. Put another
way, adoption and implementation of the quick look methodology necessarily
divides those restraints that escape per se condemnation because they may
create redeeming virtues into two categories: those that presumptively create the
sort of harm that gives rise to a prima facie case and those that do not. The latter
restraints are beyond meaningful antitrust scrutiny and are essentially lawful,
given that plaintiffs only prevail in one percent of ordinary rule of reason
cases.129
What is it, then, that distinguishes inherently suspect restraints from that
larger category of restraints that are merely pernicious within the meaning of
the Northern Pacific Railway test, but that nonetheless survive per se condemnation? Courts and the FTC both have offered various definitions. Initially, the
FTC asked whether the restraint is “the kind that appears likely, absent an
efficiency justification, to ‘restrict competition and decrease output.’”130 This
definition sweeps too broadly, however. Even a merger would be inherently
suspect, because absent an efficiency justification, such transactions merely
eliminate competition between the parties to them and thus presumably do
harm.131 Still, the FTC repeated the definition over a decade later.132 Eleven
years after the FTC first articulated this test, the Supreme Court chimed in,
offering dicta opining that a practice is subject to the quick look when “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets.”133 The D.C. Circuit has quoted the FTC’s initial
definition with approval134 but also suggested that a restraint is inherently
suspect if “it is obvious from the nature of the challenged conduct that it will
likely harm consumers,”135 “judicial experience and economic learning have
129. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (reporting that ninety-nine percent of restraints
evaluated under the ordinary rule of reason survive unscathed).
130. See Mass. Bd., 110 F.T.C. at 604.
131. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(indicating that agreements analyzed under the rule of reason result in either anticompetitive harm or
efficiencies and that “[n]o third possibility suggests itself”); Meese, supra note 22, at 98 n.100
(collecting authorities concluding that the absence of possible redeeming virtues establishes that
horizontal agreement likely exercises market power and produces harm).
132. See In re Polygram, 136 F.T.C. 310, 331–32 (2003).
133. See Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
134. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invoking the FTC’s
decision for the proposition that conduct is inherently suspect if the conduct “appears likely, absent an
efficiency justification, to restrict competition and decrease output” (quoting In re Polygram, 136 F.T.C.
at 337)).
135. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35.
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shown [such restraints] to be likely to harm consumers,”136 or there is a “close
family resemblance between the suspect practice and another practice that
already stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare”137—that is, one that
is unlawful per se. Unlike the definition of restraints that are pernicious for
purposes of the traditional per se test, which focuses solely on the reduction of
rivalry as such, inherently suspect analysis attempts to identify that narrower
class of restraints that, in addition to reducing rivalry, also threatens to produce
actual economic harm.138
Proponents of the quick look treat the framework as an alternative method of
rule of reason scrutiny that lightens the plaintiff’s burden of proving harm in
appropriate cases and thereby streamlines the adjudicatory process.139 These
advocates, including apparently the Supreme Court itself, assert that all restraints that avoid per se condemnation are not created equal; some pose a
greater risk of harm or are less likely to produce benefits than others.140 As a
result, it is said, tribunals should reject a one-size-fits-all approach to restraints
that avoid per se condemnation and instead adopt a more flexible methodology.141 Indeed, both enforcement agencies have opined that, when conducting
rule of reason analysis, the agencies will only gather that information necessary
to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.142 Thus,

136. See id. at 36–37.
137. See id. at 37.
138. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 367 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming
conclusion that restraint was inherently suspect because it likely produced actual harm, despite absence
of evidence that restraint affected price or output); Muris & Cummins, supra note 106, at 47–49
(contending that best version of the quick look relies on judicial experience and economic learning to
ascertain whether restraint is inherently suspect).
139. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911a, at 326 (explaining that the quick look’s “purpose is to
enable the tribunal to reach a confident judgment about reasonableness without having to undergo the
costs of full rule of reason proof”); Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 466–67; Gavil, supra note 76, at
777–81; see also Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
391, 424–27 (2000) (treating quick look as the appropriate response to the significant costs of
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny).
140. See Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–81 (1999); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 34–35;
Gavil, supra note 76, at 766–73 (endorsing Polygram’s conclusion that certain restraints that survive
per se condemnation nonetheless pose a greater risk of anticompetitive harm and are thus properly
treated as inherently suspect).
141. See Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. at 780–81 (“[T]here is generally no categorical line . . . between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that
call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, at 326 (“[T]he amount and
range of information needed to make a conclusion of unreasonableness, or illegality, cannot be
pigeonholed into two forms of inquiry: per se and rule of reason.”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust
Common Law for the Twenty-First Century, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 635, 643 (2009) (“[F]ederal courts
should not view each of these approaches as fixed categories of antitrust analysis, but as points along a
continuum.”); Tom & Pak, supra note 139, passim.
142. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, § 3.1, at 7–8 (“Rule of
reason analysis focuses on only those factors, and undertakes only the degree of factual inquiry,
necessary to assess accurately the overall competitive effect of the relevant agreement.” (first citing
Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. at 778–81; then citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
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they continue, there is no need to determine whether a restraint produces actual
competitive harm if the nature of the restraint itself establishes such harm as a
matter of theory and experience.143 In the same way, the Supreme Court has
opined that rule of reason analysis is properly characterized as a “sliding scale,”
whereby the nature and quantum of proof required to establish anticompetitive
harm varies depending upon the type of restraint involved.144 Within this
template, it is said, the quick look improves upon the traditional dichotomous
approach in three interrelated ways. First, the quick look reduces the costs that
plaintiffs and enforcement agencies must incur when challenging particularly
harmful restraints.145 Second, by encouraging such challenges, while still allowing defendants to offer justifications for such agreements, the quick look deters
harmful restraints.146 Third, by reducing the cost of evaluating such restraints,
while still allowing defendants to offer justifications, the quick look purportedly
enhances the accuracy of judicial and administrative assessments of challenged
restraints, thus furthering the Sherman Act’s regulatory objectives.147
IV. THE QUICK LOOK CRITIQUED: WHY STEP ONE WASTES RESOURCES AND DETERS
BENEFICIAL ACTIVITY
A remarkable consensus among scholars, jurists, and enforcement officials
contends that addition of the quick look can improve upon the traditional

459–61 (1986); and then citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104–13
(1984))); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 287 (describing that the quick look rests on the
assumption that “the fact finder collects information up to the point that its incremental value is no
longer worth the costs of obtaining it”).
143. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, § 3.3, at 10–11
(“Alternatively, where the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the
agreement, or anticompetitive harm has resulted from an agreement already in operation, then, absent
overriding benefits that could offset the anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements
without a detailed market analysis.” (emphasis added)); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d at
363–67; Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35–37.
144. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. at 780 & n.15 (“There is always something of a sliding
scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision
than we can hope for. . . . Nevertheless, the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.” (quoting AREEDA, supra note 104, ¶ 1507, at 402)); Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. at 780 n.15
(citing other scholars to the same effect); see also Gavil, supra note 76, at 777–80 (discussing with
approval the application of a “sliding scale” approach).
145. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911a, at 326 (stating that the purpose of truncated analysis is to
“enable the tribunal to reach a confident judgment about reasonableness without having to undergo the
costs of full rule of reason proof”); Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 465–69 (advocating the quick look
approach over a full-blown rule of reason because the former incurs fewer litigation costs).
146. Gavil, supra note 76, at 739 (contending that the imposition of normal burdens of proof upon
plaintiffs challenging inherently suspect restraints is “irrationally demanding” and results in underdeterrence of such restraints).
147. See, e.g., Tom & Pak, supra note 139, at 424–27 (treating quick look as the proper response to
the risk of erroneous failure to condemn harmful restraints); Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773,
773–74, 797–98 (1998) (contending that FTC’s four-step quick look test “reduc[es] error costs and the
costs of using the judicial system”).
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dichotomous approach for section 1 analysis by reducing enforcement and
adjudication costs and enhancing deterrence of harmful restraints.148 Indeed,
support for the quick look transcends traditional boundaries in the antitrust
community. Thus, members of the Harvard, Chicago, and Populist Schools of
antitrust thought all embrace this alternative to the traditional dichotomous
approach.149
Ordinarily, evaluation of this claim would require the application of decision
theory and concomitant nuanced consideration of the costs and benefits of this
proposed modification.150 However, when it comes to evaluation of the quick
look, the application of such decision theory would be overkill. Simply put,
careful analysis demonstrates that, as currently structured, the quick look methodology increases the cost of section 1 analysis with no countervailing benefits
of any sort. More precisely, application of the quick look requires tribunals to
assess whether each restraint that survives per se analysis is nonetheless inherently suspect. This requirement often requires significant investments of real
resources by tribunals, plaintiffs, and defendants. Theory and experience establish that such expenditures produce no corresponding cost reduction, enhanced
accuracy, or increased deterrence compared to the traditional dichotomous
regime. Moreover, the prospect of incurring such costs under a regime that
recognizes the quick look will induce some firms to adopt less efficient practices to avoid the cost of defending some more efficient restraints against claims
that the latter are inherently suspect.
To understand why the quick look is all pain and no gain, let us begin by
examining step one of the quick look. Under the traditional dichotomous
approach, courts evaluate all restraints not condemned as unlawful per se under
a full-blown rule of reason. By contrast, under a regime that recognizes the
quick look, tribunals cannot conduct ordinary rule of reason analysis of such
restraints without first determining whether a restraint is inherently suspect.
Unlike the first part of per se analysis, which merely requires a determination
whether a restraint reduces rivalry in some way, step one of the quick look
requires a prediction of actual economic effect based upon economic theory and
148. See supra notes 104–06 (identifying scholars, jurists, and enforcement agencies supporting the
quick look).
149. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1912; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 106, at 248–49 (2006);
Muris, supra note 99, 531–39. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp represent the Harvard School of
antitrust analysis, and Professor Muris is a member of the Chicago School. Professor Grimes is a
member of the Populist School. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools
and the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not
Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L., Autumn 2007, at 59; Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 668, 686–89 (2010) (describing the Populist school of antitrust thought).
150. See generally C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999) (describing the implications of decision theory for the content of a
multi-stage decision process for evaluating challenged restraints).
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judicial experience.151 Generating such a prediction can thus require significant
work over and above that necessary to accomplish the comparatively simple
task of determining whether a restraint is pernicious within the meaning of the
per se test.152
To be sure, tribunals can easily reject the inherently suspect label for certain
categories of restraints. Thus, mergers, partnerships, and certain ancillary restraints will avoid the inherently suspect label with little ado.153 Many other
restraints will not be so lucky, however; as Standard Oil explained, evolving
competitive conditions can cause economic actors to adopt “many new forms of
contracts and combinations.”154 In many cases, then, tribunals, particularly
those staffed by generalist judges, will have little or no expertise with a
challenged restraint. Indeed, even expert enforcement agencies sometimes misinterpret the purposes and effects of certain agreements.155 Moreover, step one of
the quick look is generally outcome determinative. After all, a determination
that a restraint is not inherently suspect results in full-blown rule of reason
scrutiny of the restraint and near-certain victory for the defendant.156 However,
as explained below, a holding that a restraint is inherently suspect always results
in condemnation of the restraint, given that courts repeatedly reject defendants’
arguments that such restraints can produce cognizable benefits and thus always

151. See Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“The object [of the quick look
analysis] is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a
confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least
quicker) look in place of a more sedulous one.”); id. (explaining that the results of the assessment of
whether restraint should be subject to truncated quick look analysis “may vary over time, if rule-ofreason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions”); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416
F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a restraint is inherently suspect and presumptively
unlawful “[i]f, based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that [it]
likely impairs competition”).
152. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text (explaining the ease of determining whether a
restraint is pernicious within the meaning of the Northern Pacific Railway test).
153. See Muris & Cummins, supra note 106, at 47 (explaining why mergers are not inherently
suspect despite resulting in elimination of competition). Both enforcement agencies have implicitly
recognized that mergers, for instance, are not inherently suspect by excluding such transactions from
analysis under their enforcement guidelines that articulate the quick look and requiring actual proof that
mergers might produce harm before challenging such transactions. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, § 1.1, at 2 (defining “competitor collaboration” to exclude
mergers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at
7–15 (2010) (describing process of market definition to determine whether mergers produce sufficient
concentration to generate competitive concern).
154. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911).
155. See Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals’ Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good than Harm?, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 271–72 (2003) (documenting how expert enforcement agencies condemned
various agreements despite advances in economic theory establishing that such contracts often produced benefits).
156. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (explaining that restraints not deemed inherently suspect undergo full-blown rule of reason scrutiny); supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical findings that restraints almost always survive full-blown rule of reason scrutiny).
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condemn such restraints at step two.157 As a result, a plaintiff will rationally
invest significant resources in attempting to convince a tribunal that a given
restraint is inherently suspect.158 Defendants will predictably respond with
investments of their own, hoping to counter the plaintiff’s argument and convince the tribunal that full-blown rule of reason analysis is appropriate, in which
case the chance of liability will fall to almost zero.159 It should thus come as no
surprise that tribunals themselves expend resources evaluating such competing
claims.160 These theoretical considerations strongly suggest that adjudication
over whether various restraints are inherently suspect will consume significant
private and public resources.161
The actual experience with administration of the quick look suggests that
these costs will be significant. Under a quick look regime, private plaintiffs
make substantial arguments before trial and then appellate courts claiming that
challenged restraints are inherently suspect.162 Enforcement agencies make
similar arguments before administrative law judges, the FTC, and courts that
review the FTC’s decisions.163 Defendants naturally respond in an effort to
convince the tribunal that the restraint instead merits full-blown rule of reason
scrutiny. In some cases, amici curiae also weigh in on one or both sides.164
Tribunals must evaluate these contentions, and members of the same tribunal

157. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text (explaining that tribunals repeatedly reject
defendants’ contentions that inherently suspect restraints may produce cognizable benefits and thus
invariably condemn such restraints).
158. See generally Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 127 (1988) (assuming that parties will invest resources in making legal arguments when
expected payoff—in light of the background probability of success and expected opponent’s arguments—
exceeds the cost of making such arguments).
159. See id.; see also supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
160. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (describing various decisions in which tribunals
consumed significant resources determining whether agreement was inherently suspect).
161. One proponent of the quick look has recognized this fact:
Because the choice of approach to the rule of reason can be outcome determinative, as was
true in the bipolar days, parties and lower courts continue to invest sizeable resources into
litigating whether a given restraint should be evaluated under the per se, quick look, or rule of
reason analysis, as if they represented three discrete and alternate choices—even as the courts
take note of California Dental’s direction that they apply a sliding scale enquiry meet [sic] for
the case.
Gavil, supra note 76, at 769. Professor Gavil does not, however, recognize the link between this insight
and the cost of conducting step one of the quick look.
162. See infra note 165 (collecting various cases, including several initiated by private plaintiffs,
claiming that challenged restraints were inherently suspect).
163. See infra note 165 (collecting various cases, including several initiated by enforcement
agencies, claiming that challenged restraints were inherently suspect).
164. See, e.g., Brief for 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors & the American Antitrust
Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)
(No. 12-416) (contending that the challenged restraint was inherently suspect, in so far as it was
“facially anticompetitive,” and should thus be considered “presumptively unlawful”); Brief for Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223
(arguing that the challenged restraint should be treated as prima facie anticompetitive).
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sometimes disagree, further increasing the cost of step one analysis. Since the
FTC first proposed the quick look nearly three decades ago, enforcement
agencies, parties, and courts have repeatedly wrestled with step one of the quick
look, devoting considerable private, administrative, and judicial resources to
adjudicating whether, in fact, a challenged restraint is inherently suspect.165
Indeed, one opinion by the FTC located, reviewed, and cited nineteen different
academic studies when determining whether horizontal restrictions on advertising generally have anticompetitive effects of the sort that would render such
restraints inherently suspect.166 In another case, an appellate court declared a
restraint presumptively unlawful early in the litigation and then changed its
mind four years later.167
Thus, the quick look’s step one entails significant enforcement and adjudication costs. These are real social costs—the same sort of costs that proponents of

165. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (rejecting the contention by the FTC and several amici
curiae briefs that reverse-patent settlements are inherently suspect); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1,
7 n.3 (2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that restraint was properly subject to a quick look analysis);
Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–81 (1999) (rejecting contention that challenged restraint
was inherently suspect and therefore subject to quick look analysis); Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. at
782–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that the restraints in question were inherently suspect);
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137–39 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that restraint was properly subject to quick look); California ex rel. Harris, 651
F.3d at 1144–62 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s determination); Deutscher
Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–32 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on plaintiff’s quick look theory); MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 332
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that challenged restraints were properly subject to quick
look); MLB Props., Inc., 542 F.3d at 337 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (rejecting plaintiff’s quick look
argument on different grounds); N. Tex. Physicians Specialty v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360–62 (5th Cir.
2008) (articulating standards governing quick look analysis); N. Tex. Physicians Specialty, 528 F.3d at
363–68 (examining challenged restraint and finding it inherently suspect); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp.,
423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to subject exclusive dealing arrangement to quick look);
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959–61 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiff’s claim that challenged restraint was subject to quick look analysis); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting lower court’s determination that
challenged restraint was subject to quick look); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367
(3d Cir. 1996) (declining to subject exclusive dealing arrangement to a quick look analysis); Chi. Prof’l
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting previous determination that
quick look applied and instead holding that proof of market power was necessary to establish a prima
facie case); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Metro.
Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiff’s contention that sports league restraint should be subject to a quick look); Holmes Prods.
Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 33–34 (D. Mass. 1997) (declining to subject exclusive
distribution agreement to quick look analysis); see also Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815,
824–27 (6th Cir. 2011) (declining to determine, after briefing and argument, whether to subject
challenged restraints to a quick look).
166. See In re Polygram, 136 F.T.C. 310, 353–58 & n.52 (2003).
167. See Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 599–602 (rejecting previous determination that quick look
applied and instead holding that proof of market power was necessary to establish a prima facie case);
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 676–77 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming preliminary
injunction after determining that challenged restraint was presumptively unlawful under a quick look
analysis).
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the quick look seek to reduce.168 Society should gladly incur such costs if doing
so produced offsetting benefits in the form of reduced costs, enhanced accuracy,
or increased deterrence compared to application of the traditional dichotomous
regime. As shown below, however, there are no such benefits and the absence of
such benefits dooms the case for the quick look.
Adjudication of whether a restraint is inherently suspect at step one of the
quick look can produce one of two results: either rejection of the inherently
suspect label, or a finding that a restraint is, in fact, inherently suspect and thus
subject to analysis at step two. The first result is the most prevalent, and the
second is relatively rare.169 Neither outcome can generate any of the benefits
that proponents of the quick look invoke. Let us consider the implications of
each possible result in turn.
Step one adjudications that yield the first and more prevalent result produce
no offsetting benefits relative to the traditional dichotomous approach. After all,
if a restraint is not inherently suspect, the tribunal must proceed to analyze the
agreement under the full-blown rule of reason. This, of course, is the exact same
result the traditional dichotomous approach would have produced absent modification by the quick look. In such cases, which are many, the quick look
unambiguously raises the cost of section 1 adjudication with no offsetting
benefit.
What, though, about the second and less likely result of step one adjudication—
namely, those instances in which a tribunal declares that a restraint is inherently
suspect? Surely these outcomes, and the streamlined analysis of such restraints
at steps two through four, produce benefits when compared to implementation
of the traditional dichotomous regime, which would subject such restraints to a
more expensive full-blown rule of reason.170 They do not—let us explain why.
Analysis of inherently suspect restraints at step two can, in turn, produce two
distinct outcomes. First, courts can condemn such restraints because defendants
fail to articulate any cognizable benefits they might create.171 Second, tribunals
can accept the articulated benefits as cognizable and proceed to analyze the
restraint at step three, relying upon the mere existence of the restraint to
establish a prima facie case and cast upon the defendant the initial burden of
168. See Posner, supra note 26, at 400 (treating such “direct costs” of litigation as social costs that
courts should consider when developing alternative legal standards); id. at 401–02 (proceeding on the
assumption that the legal system should seek to minimize the sum of “direct costs” and costs of judicial
error); supra notes 26–28, 140–46 and accompanying text (describing claims by proponents of the
quick look that full-blown rule of reason analysis is excessively costly in some cases).
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (citing numerous decisions rejecting the contention
that challenged restraint was inherently suspect).
170. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1909a, at 308 (observing that restraints subject to full-blown
rule of reason “are the most difficult and expensive to evaluate”); id. ¶ 1911a, at 326 (noting that the
quick look allows a tribunal “to reach a confident judgment about reasonableness without having to
undergo the costs of full rule of reason proof”).
171. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 368–70 (5th Cir. 2008); Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604–08 (1988).
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adducing evidence that the restraint produces such benefits.172 Both results
appear to entail lower adjudication costs than full-blown rule of reason analysis
because both absolve the plaintiff of any burden of proving that a restraint in
fact produces harm.173 Such reduced costs could, in turn, encourage meritorious
challenges and enhance the accuracy of resulting adjudication. Proponents of
the quick look invoke these benefits to justify this departure from the traditional
approach.174
However, closer inspection reveals that any such benefits compared to the
traditional dichotomous approach are illusory, at least in a regime where
tribunals understand and properly apply the per se test at the outset of section 1
analysis. To see why, let us consider the two possible outcomes of adjudication
at step two. Consider first the inherently suspect restraints that fail at step two
because defendants cannot articulate any cognizable benefits that such restraints
might create. As applied to such restraints, analysis and resulting condemnation
at step two certainly appear cheaper than a full-blown rule of reason analysis,
which might also be more prone to error. However, this realization ignores the
fact that restraints condemned in this fashion satisfy the test for per se illegality
and should not have made it to step two or, for that matter, step one in the first
place. After all, restraints that are inherently suspect will reduce rivalry between
the parties and thus have a pernicious effect on competition within the meaning
of the Northern Pacific Railway test.175 Moreover, by stipulation, such restraints
cannot produce redeeming virtues—that is why they fail at the quick look’s step
two.176 Thus, application of traditional per se analysis should result in per se
condemnation of each and every restraint that the quick look condemns at step
two. Indeed, the cost of per se condemnation will be lower, and such condemnation will be more certain, given the ease of determining that restraints reduce
rivalry and thus produce a pernicious effect on competition.177 To reiterate, if
tribunals have properly applied per se analysis as an initial matter, the set of
contracts that are both inherently suspect and lack redeeming virtues and
thereby fail at step two should be empty.178 Thus, the tendency of quick look

172. See supra notes 117–24 and accompanying text (describing this step of the quick look).
173. See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that courts and agencies equate
cognizable benefits with redeeming virtues and vice versa).
177. For instance, a tribunal need not review and cite nineteen scholarly articles and hear the
testimony of two economists to determine that a horizontal agreement to eliminate advertising has a
pernicious effect on competition within the meaning of the Northern Pacific Railway test. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text (detailing the FTC’s invocation of such support for its determination
that a restraint was inherently suspect).
178. Some courts have glimpsed such redundancy but nonetheless continued to conduct per se and
quick look analysis seriatim. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (“We conclude that a ‘quick look’ conclusion of antitrust illegality is here inappropriate. This is so for many of the same reasons that per se treatment is not correct.”); MLB Props., Inc. v.
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analysis to condemn such restraints is not a “benefit” that offsets the considerable cost of step one analysis.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, which some
have invoked as a quintessential articulation of the quick look, exemplifies how
proper application of traditional per se analysis would have condemned restraints also condemned at step two.179 There, parties to an otherwise legitimate
joint venture adopted a temporary ban on advertising and discounting with
respect to products that were not part of the venture.180 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit—like the FTC below—did not apply the Northern Pacific Railway test
for per se illegality or otherwise explain why the horizontal restraints between
rivals survived per se condemnation.181 Instead, the court proceeded to apply
the four-step quick look test.182 The court found the restraint inherently suspect
because it “look[ed] suspiciously like a naked price fixing agreement between
competitors.”183 In so doing, the court affirmed the judgment of the FTC, which
had reached the same conclusion after reviewing testimony by two experts as
well as nineteen economic studies regarding the impact of restrictions on
advertising.184 Having found the restraint inherently suspect, the court moved
on to step two of the quick look, where it rejected the defendant’s claim that the
restraint could produce cognizable benefits and held that the reduction of
interbrand freeriding—although a plausible impact of the restraint—was not
cognizable for antitrust purposes.185
Two years after Polygram, the Supreme Court reiterated the Northern Pacific
Railway per se test.186 Proper application of this test in Polygram would have
resulted in condemnation of the restraint. The restraint plainly had a pernicious
impact on competition, as it eliminated discounting and advertising by horizon-

Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s per se and quick look arguments for
the same reasons).
179. 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 465–67 (invoking and discussing
Polygram as the template for quick look analysis); Crane, supra note 29, at 61–63 (treating the
Polygram decision as a recent example rejecting “dualistic” section 1 categories in favor of flexible
quick look); Gavil, supra note 76, at 766–68 (discussing “groundbreaking” Polygram decision with
approval).
180. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 32.
181. See id. at 36.
182. Id. at 35–38.
183. Id. at 37.
184. See In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 353–58 & n.52 (2003).
185. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37–38. Some have argued persuasively that the D.C. Circuit and the
FTC erred in holding that the elimination of interbrand freeriding is not a cognizable benefit. See, e.g.,
Joshua D. Wright, Singing Along: A Comment on Goldberg & Muris on the Three Tenors, 1 REV. L. &
ECON. 399, 399–401 (2005); William Kolasky & Richard Elliott, The Federal Trade Commission’s
Three Tenors Decision: “Qual due fiori a un solo stello,” 18 ANTITRUST, Spring 2004, at 50, 50. If so,
then economic logic suggests that such a restraint should receive full-blown rule of reason scrutiny. See
infra notes 222–40 and accompanying text.
186. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
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tal rivals.187 No additional analysis at this stage is necessary. Moreover, because
the defendant could not articulate a benefit that the court deemed cognizable,
such restraints could not produce redeeming virtues.188 Thus, the challenged
restraints were unlawful per se. Application of the quick look achieved the same
result as the traditional dichotomous approach, albeit at the higher cost of
determining whether the restraint was inherently suspect.
As a result, those who seek to justify the additional costs of determining
whether a restraint is inherently suspect must locate some other cost-reducing
feature of quick look analysis. This brings us to the second possible outcome of
adjudication at step two of the quick look: determination that the defendant has
articulated one or more cognizable benefits that the challenged restraint might
produce, thereby warranting consideration at step three. If the full-blown rule of
reason controlled the analysis of such restraints, plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate actual economic harm to establish a prima facie case, a demonstration that defendants would be free to contest before shouldering any burden of
proving that the restraint produces benefits.189 Under step three, by contrast,
plaintiffs can simply rest upon the determination that the restraint is inherently
suspect to establish a prima facie case, thereby shifting the burden of producing
evidence of benefits to the defendants.190
It is theoretically possible that the reduced cost of analyzing inherently
suspect restraints that survive step two could offset the increased cost imposed
by the addition of step one to the analysis of restraints that survive per se
condemnation. At the same time, a review of case law reveals that the argument
is just that—theoretical. That is, tribunals applying step two repeatedly reject
defendants’ contentions that the restraint in question could produce cognizable
benefits.191 More bluntly, restraints that make it to step two never survive to
step three. Time and again, a determination that a restraint is inherently suspect
goes hand-in-hand with a subsequent determination that the benefits that defendants articulate, if any, are not cognizable.192 Thus, despite its possible theoreti-

187. See Catalano Sales, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648–50 (1980) (finding that
horizontal agreement on credit terms was the functional equivalent of a ban on discounting and thus
unlawful per se under the Northern Pacific Railway test); see also Crane, supra note 29, at 62
(explaining that the “rule-based system” that predated the quick look would have condemned the
Polygram restraint, assuming the restraint could produce no redeeming virtues).
188. See Crane, supra note 29, at 62; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining
that the standards governing whether purported benefits are redeeming virtues, when applying the per
se rule or cognizable benefits under step two of the quick look, are identical).
189. See supra notes 83–84, 90–92 and accompanying text (articulating this aspect of full-blown
rule of reason analysis).
190. See supra notes 117–24 and accompanying text.
191. See infra note 192 (collecting various decisions rejecting contentions that inherently suspect
restraints produce cognizable benefits).
192. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that the challenged
practice was either unlawful per se or inherently suspect and rejecting defendants’ proffered justifications);
N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360–71 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the FTC’s
determination that the challenged restraint was inherently suspect and rejecting the defendant’s argu-
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cal appeal, step three’s lightened prima facie case for inherently suspect restraints
has played no role in actual antitrust analysis for the simple reason that, so far
as this author is aware, no restraint ever survives that long in quick look
analysis. In sum, step one of the quick look increases the costs of conducting
section 1 analysis without producing any offsetting benefits in the form of lower
costs, enhanced accuracy, or increased deterrence.
Engrafting the quick look onto the traditional dichotomous approach will do
more than needlessly consume private, administrative, and judicial resources.
The quick look will also deter some wealth-creating restraints. After all, defendants will bear a portion of the needless costs of performing the quick look. In
particular, defendants will expend resources at step one, attempting to convince
the tribunal that the challenged restraint is not inherently suspect. Moreover, in
those rare cases where tribunals do declare restraints suspect, defendants will
expend resources attempting to articulate cognizable benefits that the restraint
might create. Although defendants almost always prevail at step one, such
victories are not free and the prospect of expending resources to prevail in such
cases will presumably induce some potential defendants to adopt practices less
likely to be challenged, even though they will produce fewer benefits.193 For
instance, parties to a joint venture who fear that collateral restraints might be
declared inherently suspect may simply merge outright, thereby taking advantage of the defendant-friendly standards governing merger analysis.194 Thus, in
ment that the restraint could produce cognizable benefits); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29,
35–39 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming the FTC’s determination that the challenged restraint was inherently
suspect and that the defendants had not articulated redeeming virtues); In re Detroit Auto Dealers
Ass’n, 111 F.T.C. 417, 498–99 (1989) (finding the challenged practice inherently suspect and rejecting
defendants’ claim that the restraint could produce redeeming virtues), aff’d in part and remanded, 955
F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 606–08 (1988)
(finding that the challenged restraint was inherently suspect and rejecting defendants’ argument that the
restraint could plausibly produce cognizable benefits); see also In re Realcomp II, Ltd., No. 9320, 2009
FTC Lexis 250, at *38 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2009) (holding that the challenged restraint was inherently
suspect and rejecting defendant’s argument that the restraint could plausibly produce redeeming
virtues), petition for review denied, Realcomp II Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824–27 (6th Cir. 2011); In
re Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 F.T.C. 344 (1989) (finding that the challenged practice was inherently
suspect and that there were no possible redeeming virtues for such conduct), rev’d on other grounds,
922 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1991); In re New Eng. Motor Carrier Rate Bureau, Inc., No. 9170, 1989 WL
1126783, at *56 (F.T.C. August 18, 1989) (same).
193. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 244 (1991) (“[A] firm
maximizes its profits by discovering the least costly method of organization within its legal environment. The cost of litigating and losing lawsuits . . . can be as high as the cost of inefficiencies in
technology or organization. A less efficient form of organization might even be preferable, if the more
efficient form is illegal or poses significant legal risks.” (emphasis added)); Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand
Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 30–31 (2004) (explaining how poorly crafted
antitrust doctrine and resulting litigation risk can encourage firms to adopt suboptimal practices).
194. Victor P. Goldberg, Featuring the Three Tenors in La Triviata, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 55, 56 (2005)
(noting the irony in the D.C. Circuit’s summary condemnation of restraint in Polygram given that
complete merger between the parties would have survived scrutiny absent market power); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at §§ 4, 5 (describing process of
scrutinizing proposed mergers, including required definition of the relevant market and calculation of
market concentration).
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addition to imposing unnecessary social costs of enforcement and adjudication,
the quick look also functions as a tax on productive activity that plaintiffs might
plausibly characterize as inherently suspect, thereby inducing parties to adopt
less efficient restraints. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
antitrust standards that treat some forms of economic integration more harshly
than others can induce market actors to select less efficient practices that pose
less legal risk, contrary to the objectives of the Sherman Act.195
V. POSSIBLE REFORMS OF THE QUICK LOOK
The mere fact that the quick look, as currently structured, consumes agency,
private, and judicial resources with no offsetting benefits does not thereby
establish that the traditional dichotomous approach is the best we can construct.
This Part raises and explores two ways courts and agencies could alter the quick
look so as to achieve its putative goals. First, courts and agencies could better
integrate per se and quick look analysis. Second, these actors could expand the
definition of inherently suspect, thereby expanding the quick look to reach more
restraints. Neither approach, it will be seen, promises any improvement over the
traditional dichotomous approach.
A. BETTER INTEGRATION OF PER SE AND QUICK LOOK ANALYSIS AND ELIMINATION OF
STEP TWO

As explained above, the quick look imposes significant and unnecessary costs
on private actors and agencies while deterring some beneficial restraints. Courts
and agencies could eliminate many of these unnecessary costs by employing
their common law and administrative discretion to better integrate per se and
quick look analysis.196 In particular, tribunals can defer any application of the
quick look until they have actually applied the Northern Pacific Railway test to
the restraint. Rigorous application of this test will weed out every restraint that
step two of the quick look would condemn, eliminating the need for that portion
of the quick look test. By deferring the inherently suspect inquiry until after
defendants have articulated plausible redeeming virtues, courts and agencies
would avoid altogether the wasteful cost identified earlier of determining whether
restraints that cannot create such virtues are inherently suspect, when a cheaper
determination that they are pernicious would suffice to justify per se

195. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16–17 (1997) (observing that per se ban on maximum
resale price maintenance had induced some manufacturers to integrate forward so as to obtain absolute
control over resale prices free of Sherman Act scrutiny); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 728 (1988) (recognizing that hostile treatment of certain forms of contractual integration
could induce firms to opt for other less efficient methods); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977) (recognizing that hostile treatment of nonprice vertical restraints could induce
manufacturers to integrate forward into distribution).
196. See generally supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (explaining that courts possess
common law discretion to create subsidiary rules, such as the per se rule, that implement Standard Oil’s
rule of reason).
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condemnation.197
Such integration is long overdue. To put it bluntly, both lower courts and the
FTC have sometimes ignored or misstated the per se rule. As noted earlier, for
instance, neither the FTC nor the D.C. Circuit applied the Northern Pacific
Railway test in Polygram, moving immediately to apply the four-step quick
look.198 Although the decision that first articulated the quick look as a four-step
test did discuss the per se rule, it did not mention the Northern Pacific Railway
test for establishing liability.199 Instead, the FTC claimed that the per se rule
required a restraint to be “condemned automatically, without regard for any
redeeming competitive virtues, if it can be categorized as falling into a per se
category.”200 The FTC invoked the putative per se rule against group boycotts
as an example of such an overinclusive and inflexible per se rule.201
It cannot be denied that, during antitrust’s inhospitality era, some decisions
misapplied the Northern Pacific Railway test, overlooking redeeming virtues
that are obvious to modern eyes and declaring apparently beneficial restraints
unlawful per se.202 In a regime characterized by such overbroad per se rules, the
quick look, as employed by decisions like Polygram, could function as a sort of
“safety valve,” allowing defendants to avoid summary condemnation of otherwise unlawful restraints by invoking redeeming virtues that tribunals previously
ignored. Indeed, some scholars have characterized certain applications of the
quick look in exactly this manner.203
However, misapplications of the per se rule two generations ago do not
justify skipping per se analysis altogether as some tribunals have done in the

197. See supra notes 168–88 and accompanying text (explaining how the traditional Northern
Pacific Railway test would condemn restraints that cannot produce redeeming virtues, thereby obviating
the need for determining whether such restraints are inherently suspect). Of course, if a restraint
survives the per se test because it does not reduce rivalry and is therefore not pernicious, it cannot be
inherently suspect. See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text (detailing how the test for
determining whether a restraint is inherently suspect is more stringent than the Northern Pacific
Railway test for determining whether a restraint is “pernicious”).
198. See supra notes 179–82; see also N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360–61
(5th Cir. 2008) (proceeding to quick look analysis without explaining why the restraint survived per se
condemnation).
199. See In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 602–04 (1988).
200. Id. at 603.
201. The FTC discussed Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), as exemplifying the overinclusive per se rule against group boycotts that did not recognize
the possibility that such boycotts could produce redeeming virtues. See Mass Bd., 110 F.T.C. at
603 n.11.
202. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), is a classic example. There, the Court,
after quoting the Northern Pacific Railway test, condemned as unlawful per se restraints that plainly
had the potential to create redeeming virtues: encouraging promotion of the venture’s product by
individual members. Indeed, the district court had found that the restraints had exactly this effect. See
id. at 604–06 (summarizing district court’s factual findings and conclusion that the challenged restraints
were procompetitive); see also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (banning
nonprice vertical restraints whenever title passed from manufacturer to a wholesaler or dealer),
overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
203. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911a, at 325–26.
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modern era. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been correcting these mistakes for
nearly four decades now, holding that restraints once deemed unlawful per se
may produce redeeming virtues and, thus, deserve rule of reason scrutiny.204 For
instance, the Court jettisoned the per se rule against group boycotts three years
before the FTC invoked this (nonexistent) rule as the sort of overinclusive per
se rule the quick look could remedy.205 Nor would one expect tribunals that
misapplied the per se rule by ignoring possible redeeming virtues in the per se
context to suddenly recognize such virtues when applying the quick look.
Courts and enforcement agencies serious about reforming the traditional dichotomous approach would do well to refresh their understanding of the Northern
Pacific Railway test and adjust any proposed reforms accordingly.
By focusing the quick look on those restraints that may produce redeeming
virtues, courts and enforcement agencies could eliminate step two altogether.206
This revised approach would also reserve step one for those restraints that avoid
per se condemnation because they may produce redeeming virtues, thereby
reducing the number of step one adjudications and thus the cost of implementing this stage of the quick look. Determination at this stage that such a restraint
is inherently suspect would (properly) lighten the plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prima facie case, leaving restraints not deemed inherently suspect to
full-blown rule of reason analysis with its correspondingly heavier burden on
plaintiffs. The result would be a return to the “traditional dichotomous regime”
modified to lighten a plaintiff’s burden for establishing a prima facie case
against those restraints that avoid per se condemnation but are nonetheless
inherently suspect. In this way, courts and agencies could still distinguish
between restraints that truly deserve full-blown rule of reason treatment, and
those that, because of their more apparent anti-competitive potential, merit
truncated scrutiny and thus a relaxed burden of establishing a prima facie
case.207
Improved integration of per se and quick look analysis combined with the
elimination of step two would not, however, be a panacea for the quick look.
After all, if step two is eliminated and per se analysis is conducted with greater
care, courts will only apply the inherently suspect inquiry to restraints that, by

204. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (rejecting per se
ban on minimum resale price maintenance); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59
(1977) (rejecting per se ban on nonprice vertical restraints).
205. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985)
(rejecting per se rule for group boycotts).
206. Under the current version of the quick look, step two entails assessing whether a challenged
restraint may produce redeeming virtues. Reserving the quick look for those restraints that have
survived per se scrutiny would thus render any step two inquiry redundant.
207. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (explaining that the only difference between
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny and scrutiny of restraints that survive step two of the quick look is the
lighter burden plaintiffs bear in establishing a prima facie case). Although courts will have to spend
resources conducting the second part of the per se test to determine if a restraint might produce
redeeming virtues, they would have to conduct a similar analysis under step two of the quick look.
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definition, may produce redeeming virtues. However, as explained previously,
despite nearly three decades of experience with the quick look, neither courts
nor agencies have identified any restraint that is inherently suspect but may also
produce redeeming virtues.208 Absent some reason to believe that courts or
agencies will reverse course and decide that some inherently suspect restraints
can produce redeeming virtues, a quick look reformed in the way described thus
far would still require tribunals to incur the cost of discerning whether certain
restraints are inherently suspect without the prospect of discovering any such
restraints. Here again, this exercise would needlessly consume judicial, agency,
and private resources and deter some beneficial restraints.
B. EXPANSION OF THE CATEGORY OF RESTRAINTS DEEMED INHERENTLY SUSPECT

Perhaps the absence of restraints that are both inherently suspect but that
might still produce redeeming virtues reflects a more fundamental problem—
namely, that agencies and courts have been too reluctant to declare restraints
inherently suspect. If, instead, courts and agencies expand the category of
restraints deemed inherently suspect, perhaps the modified quick look described
above will capture more restraints that—although potential sources of redeeming virtues—nonetheless pose so much competitive risk that truncated analysis
is appropriate. If so, then a modified quick look could, in fact, produce benefits
that offset the additional costs imposed on section 1 analysis by the application
of step one.209
There is, of course, no reason that the category of restraints deemed inherently suspect should remain frozen in its current, miniscule incarnation. The
rule of reason’s strength lies in the license it provides courts and agencies to
refashion antitrust doctrine, including the scope of per se rules and the methodology of rule of reason analysis, without legislative intervention whenever (exogenous) changes in economic theory or the experience derived from antitrust
litigation warrants such change.210 Similar considerations suggest that courts
should adjust the nature of quick look analysis, including the definition of
inherently suspect, if economic theory evolves in a manner that suggests such
an adjustment is necessary or when such adjustment can increase the net

208. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 117–24, 171–73 and accompanying text (explaining how current articulations
of the quick look contemplate the existence of such restraints).
210. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997) (defining the rule of reason as empowering
courts to reject previously adopted per se rules when economic theory undermines their premises); Bus.
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (same); Meese, supra note 22, at 89–92
(explaining how Standard Oil’s rule of reason empowers courts to adjust antitrust doctrine so as to
reflect evolving economic theory); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 536 (contending that rule of
reason treatment of challenged restraints allows courts to gather information about actual operation of
restraints to inform subsequent rules).
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benefits of rule of reason analysis.211
At the same time, courts and agencies should not expand the inherently
suspect category for the mere sake of expansion, even if such expansion reduces
enforcement and adjudication costs and enhances deterrence of some conduct in
the newly expanded category. Although deterring harmful conduct and reducing
enforcement and adjudication costs are important objectives, these benefits must
be weighed against the social cost of deterring beneficial conduct.212 Any
expansion of the category of inherently suspect restraints and the resulting
presumption against such agreements could sweep within its ambit practices
that often produce significant benefits, while leaving conduct with analogous
economic effects subject only to full-blown rule of reason analysis. Plaintiffs, of
course, could establish a prima facie case against conduct deemed inherently
suspect at little cost.
Defendants would be free to rebut the prima facie case that would arise
because of the mere existence of such inherently suspect restraints. However,
such rebuttal would be costly and also subject to the plaintiff’s assertion that,
for instance, the defendant could have achieved the same benefits by means of a
less restrictive alternative.213 Even if defendants anticipated ultimate victory in
each such case, they would still hope to avoid the costs of such adjudication
under the quick look framework in the first place. As explained earlier, potential
defendants who fear that courts or agencies will deem a beneficial practice
inherently suspect may adopt different and less beneficial practices, to the
detriment of consumers and the rest of society, in order to avoid the significantly higher—and asymmetrical—costs of defending those restraints that are
deemed suspect.214 Proponents of any new and more expansive definition of
inherently suspect bear the burden of explaining why the resulting benefits

211. See Cal. Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (suggesting that experience derived
from full-blown rule of reason analysis “over time” can lead courts to adjust the category of restraints
deemed inherently suspect).
212. Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894–95 (2007) (rejecting
the argument that administrative convenience could justify per se condemnation of conduct that is often
reasonable).
213. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (explaining that firms may adopt inefficient
practices if they believe tribunals may declare efficient conduct inherently suspect). The defendant’s
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), is instructive. There, the Court condemned as unlawful per se vertically imposed exclusive
territories and other restrictions on resale whenever title passed to dealers but analyzed otherwise
identical consignment agreements under a forgiving rule of reason. Schwinn responded to the decision
by retaining title to all its products before sale to the ultimate consumer as a transitional step toward
complete vertical integration into distribution. See Robert C. Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 BUS. LAW.
669, 685–86 (1968). Presumably such complete integration, accomplished solely to avoid Sherman Act
liability, produced fewer economic benefits than the firm’s original system of distribution. See Bus.
Elecs., 485 U.S. at 728 (refusing to impose per se ban on conduct indistinguishable from that which
produced significant benefits because “[m]anufacturers would be likely to forgo legitimate and competitively useful conduct rather than risk treble damages and perhaps even criminal penalties”).
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would exceed the social costs of deterring such beneficial restraints.215
A canvas of scholarly, judicial, and official commentary suggests that the
prospects for developing a more expansive but defensible definition of inherently suspect are dim. For one thing, as explained earlier, the current definition
of inherently suspect is far from clear.216 It is difficult to evaluate the impact of
proposals to expand a category that no court or agency can define with precision
even before such expansion. Moreover, there is no consensus among proponents
of the quick look about the appropriate treatment of some restraints that
scholars have studied for decades. For instance, some proponents would expand
the category to include certain vertical restraints, particularly minimum resale
price maintenance.217 Indeed, several plaintiffs have attempted to convince
courts that various vertical restraints are inherently suspect and thus subject to
quick look scrutiny.218 Other scholars, however, have just as vehemently rejected such an approach.219 Some other scholars have recommended attaching
the inherently suspect label to at least some horizontal restraints that are plainly
ancillary to otherwise legitimate joint ventures, such as the restraints challenged
in United States v. Topco.220 Here again, other proponents of the quick look

215. See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 724 (explaining that departure from the full-blown rule of reason
must turn on “demonstrable economic effect” of condemned restraints (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977))).
216. See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text.
217. See Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price
Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 196–98 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (contending that courts should apply
quick look to minimum resale price maintenance); Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin:
Seeking Consensus Reform of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 492–94
(2008) (same); Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really “Knaves”?: The Coming
Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, 21 ANTITRUST 61, 65 (2007) (endorsing quick look for minimum resale
price maintenance as a “compromise” between per se condemnation and full-blown rule of reason).
218. See Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to subject
exclusive dealing arrangement to quick look); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358,
1367 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that exclusive agreement between film distributor and plaintiff’s rival merited quick look analysis); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986
F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to subject exclusive dealing arrangement to quick look
analysis); Holmes Prods. Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 33–34 (D. Mass. 1997)
(declining to subject exclusive distribution agreement to quick look analysis).
219. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ¶ 1911a, at 327 n.7 (discussing with approval decisions holding
that minimum resale price maintenance is not inherently suspect); see also Thomas A. Lambert, Dr.
Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price
Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1969–72 (2009) (rejecting quick look approach to
minimum resale price maintenance); Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks
Before the British Institute of International and Comparative Law: The Economics of Resale Price
Maintenance & Implications for Competition Law and Policy 21–22 (April 9, 2014) (transcript
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/302501/140409rpm.pdf ) (“In
light of the existing economic evidence on [resale price maintenance] and other vertical restraints, it is
hard to justify a per se or ‘inherently suspect’ approach to analyzing minimum [resale price maintenance] agreements . . . .” (alteration in original)).
220. See Klein, supra note 103, at 11 & n.8 (opining that the Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division would treat restraints such as those challenged in United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S.
596 (1972), as inherently suspect under a “stepwise” or quick look approach); Robert Pitofsky, A
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have rejected the claim that such restraints are inherently suspect.221
The absence of a consensus among scholars, officials, and judges about the
treatment of particular restraints does not itself preclude the possibility that
there is some organizing principle that would offer an improvement over the
current methodology for identifying restraints that are inherently suspect. A
review of the literature and the case law suggests two possible organizing
principles. Neither, however, appears promising.
First, courts and agencies could treat all horizontal restraints as inherently
suspect, reserving full-blown rule of reason analysis for vertical restraints.
However, such an approach would be unjustified. To be sure, courts have often
said that horizontal restraints pose a greater risk of competitive harm than
vertical restraints and that this greater risk justifies more intrusive scrutiny of
such restraints.222 However, neither these statements nor any other discernible
principle would justify treating all horizontal restraints that survive per se
condemnation as inherently suspect. After all, the category of horizontal restraints includes mergers, the formation of partnerships, and various forms of
less complete contractual integration such as franchising and amateur sports
leagues.223 The category also includes agreements that the common law treated
as ancillary and thus presumptively lawful, such as restraints ancillary to
formation of a partnership.224 According to William Howard Taft, for instance,
such partnership-enhancing restraints were not only presumptively reasonable
but were “to be encouraged.”225 Recent developments in economic theory—the
same developments that caused courts to contract the scope of the per se
rule—have buttressed the common law’s implicit conclusion that such restraints
can often produce redeeming virtues.226 Declaring all horizontal restraints
inherently suspect would presumptively condemn all manner of cooperation
necessary to allocate resources to their highest valued use, relegating economic

Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986) (contending that
Topco restraints should have been presumed unlawful and condemned because defendants could have
achieved objectives through a less restrictive alternative).
221. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 281 (concluding that courts should analyze restraints such as
those challenged in Topco under full-blown rule of reason).
222. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734–35 (1988) (distinguishing, twice, a
restraint before the Court from analogous horizontal price fixing that was purportedly more harmful
(citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 & nn.27–28 (1977))).
223. See Meese, supra note 193, at 69 & nn.312–14 (collecting authorities demonstrating that
franchising contracts are horizontal).
224. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (6th Cir. 1898).
225. Id. at 280; see also Matthews v. Associated Press of N.Y., 136 N.Y. 333, 342 (1893) (subjecting
similar restraints to lenient analysis); Bork, supra note 63, at 380–84 (explaining why such restraints
can produce benefits despite reducing horizontal rivalry); Bork, supra note 63, at 389–90 (contending
that such restraints should survive antitrust scrutiny absent proof that proponents of the restraint possess
market power).
226. See Meese, supra note 22, at 134–41 (explaining how the advent of transaction cost economics
undermined the economic premises of expansive per se rules announced during antitrust’s inhospitality
era); id. at 141–44 (explaining how these developments induced the Supreme Court to contract the
scope of per se rules, beginning in 1977).
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actors to cooperation achieved through atomistic interaction in the spot market
or complete integration.227 As the Supreme Court explained over a century ago,
such a literalistic ban on all contractual cooperation would “render difficult, if
not impossible, any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce.”228
Second, courts could identify the subset of horizontal restraints that expressly
set minimum prices or maximum output, declaring such restraints inherently
suspect even if they otherwise survived per se condemnation because they may
produce redeeming virtues.229 This category would be significantly smaller
than, say, the category of “horizontal” restraints. Here again, however, the case
for treating this group of restraints as inherently suspect is not particularly
strong. Recall that the category would not include so-called naked restraints,
which would be deemed unlawful per se because of the lack of any prospect
that such agreements could produce redeeming virtues.230 Thus, the category
would only include those restraints on price or output with respect to which
defendants were able to adduce a plausible claim that the restrictions produced
redeeming virtues.231 Examples might include agreements among members of
an amateur sports conference on the number of games each member can play
per season (output), whether members can engage in post-season play (output),

227. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Cooperation is
the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to cooperate in some respects before they may
compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient production. . . . Antitrust law is designed to
ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to
compete full tilt at every moment.”); Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope
and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 489–93 (2000) (contending that courts
should analyze nonancillary horizontal restraints that avoid per se condemnation under the full-blown
rule of reason analysis).
228. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911); see also Muris & Cummins,
supra note 106, at 47–49 (endorsing Polygram’s quick look framework but contending that the FTC has
improperly expanded the definition of inherently suspect).
229. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36–37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (treating restrictions on
pricing and advertising as inherently suspect); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding that explicit restriction on output of games, while not unlawful per se, shifted
burden to the defendant), modified, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that, given the extent of
integration between the parties, the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing that the defendants
possessed power in a properly defined relevant market). Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to
contend that minimum resale price maintenance, although vertical, should be inherently suspect. See
supra note 219 (collecting scholarly authorities contending that courts and agencies should treat
minimum retail price maintenance as inherently suspect, despite the fact that such restraints can
produce redeeming virtues).
230. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 279 (properly defining as “naked” those restraints “formed
with the objectively intended purpose or likely effect of increasing price or decreasing output in the
short run”).
231. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 596–600 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
explicit horizontal agreements setting the output of broadcast games could plausibly create redeeming
virtues thereby justifying full-blown rule of reason scrutiny); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 (1984) (explaining that an agreement between NCAA members to
limit compensation of student athletes could overcome market failure and enhance interbrand rivalry
with other forms of entertainment).
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and the number and size of scholarships that each member can award (price).232
Recall also that the formation and subsequent operation of mergers and partnerships both result in price fixing far more certain and all-encompassing than
explicit horizontal restraints. When challenging the initial formation of such
ventures, plaintiffs must establish the boundaries of the relevant market and the
level of concentration within the market.233 The plaintiff must also demonstrate
that the level of concentration resulting from the transaction exceeds some threshold
and thus indicates that the transaction may create anticompetitive harm. Moreover, if
such transactions pass muster, any subsequent price setting by participants in
the venture is “perfectly proper;” that is, lawful per se.234
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that departure from the full-blown
rule of reason must turn on “demonstrable economic effect” instead of “formalistic line drawing.”235 Thus, classification of explicit price or output restraints that
survive per se condemnation as inherently suspect must depend upon some
theoretical argument or empirical evidence that such restraints pose a risk of net
economic harm significantly greater than that posed by mergers, partnerships, or
other horizontal restraints between independent firms that merit full-blown rule
of reason scrutiny.236 The theoretical basis for such a conclusion is by no means
apparent. To be sure, received antitrust wisdom holds that, say, horizontal
mergers that necessarily extinguish price competition can nonetheless generate
technological efficiencies such as economies of scale.237 One could argue that
the prospect that such transactions might generate these efficiencies justifies less
intrusive scrutiny compared to horizontal restraints between independent firms
on price or output that may generate nontechnological, and thus more fleeting,
efficiencies.238
232. The Ivy League, for instance, prohibits members from awarding athletic scholarships and from
participating in the post-season Football Championship Subdivision tournament. See Jacob D. H.
Feldman & Scott A. Sherman, Ivy League Remains Absent from Expanding FCS Playoff, HARV. CRIMSON
(May 29, 2013), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/5/29/harvard-football-ivy-league-fcs/; Prospective Student-Athletes Information, IVY LEAGUE, http://www.ivyleaguesports.com/information/psa/index
(last visited Jan. 27, 2016). These agreements constitute explicit horizontal restrictions on price and output.
233. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715–17 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2001); HOVENKAMP, supra
note 24, at 564–75.
234. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006) (“As a single entity, a joint venture, like any
other firm, must have the discretion . . . to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified
price.”); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (explaining that price
fixing between partners is “perfectly proper”).
235. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977)); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1992) (stating that presumptions employed in antitrust litigation should rest
on market realities and not formalistic distinctions).
236. Cf. Muris & Cummins, supra note 106, at 47–49 (contending that empirical evidence and
economic logic are the only appropriate bases for declaring a restraint inherently suspect).
237. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 545; Givens, supra note 55, at 52–53 (concluding that
mergers are “far more competition-destroying” than other restraints but nonetheless avoid per se
condemnation because they may produce redeeming virtues, such as economies of scale).
238. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 545 (“Most mergers are legal . . . because they can increase . . . efficiency . . . .”).
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However, any distinction between “technological efficiencies” achieved
through complete integration and nontechnological efficiencies achieved via
partial integration is illusory as a matter of economic theory and thus does not
justify more hostile treatment of partial contractual integration that, like a
merger, also reduces rivalry on price or output. After all, both technological and
nontechnological efficiencies have the same (beneficial) impact on economic
welfare. That is, both steer resources to their highest valued use and thus
maximize the value of society’s output.239 To paraphrase Standard Oil, both
sorts of efficiencies “fructify” commerce and thereby counsel against condemning a restraint under the rule of reason.240 If complete and long-term price fixing
accomplished by merger does not presumptively offend the antitrust laws
because of possible technological benefits, there is no reason to presumptively condemn less complete and less durable price fixing or output reduction that may produce redeeming virtues simply because those virtues are
nontechnological.
None of this is to say that most horizontal price fixing or output reduction
agreements between two or more firms may plausibly create cognizable benefits. Perhaps the opposite is true. That is, perhaps most horizontal price fixing
between separate firms cannot plausibly create such benefits and is thus naked.
If so, then horizontal mergers, for instance, will produce benefits more often
than such horizontal price fixing. However, such a differential probability of
producing benefits does not justify treating non-naked horizontal restraints more
harshly than mergers. After all, if a restraint is naked, then application of the per
se rule will condemn it for that reason alone, thereby obviating the need for any
rule of reason analysis—full-blown, quick look, or in-between. By contrast,
non-naked horizontal restraints will survive such condemnation precisely because they may produce redeeming virtues. Absent proof—and I know of
none—that non-naked horizontal price or output restraints are significantly
more likely to produce harm than mergers or agreements that do not mention
price or output, there is no justification for treating such price or output
restraints as inherently suspect.
CONCLUSION
The indisputable costs of full-blown rule of reason analysis understandably
encourage courts, scholars, and enforcement officials to explore alternative
methods for evaluating the numerous restraints that avoid per se condemnation.
This Article has examined one such reform, the so-called quick look. Propo239. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 75, at 510–13; see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22 (3d ed. 1990) (equating increased productive
efficiency with improvement in the allocation of resources); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 22 & n.4 (1968) (equating productive
efficiencies with allocative efficiency).
240. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55–56 (1911) (explaining that the tendency
of a restraint to “fructify” commerce renders it reasonable).
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nents of the quick look claim that this mode of analysis improves upon the
traditional dichotomous approach by reducing enforcement and adjudication
costs, enhancing the accuracy of administrative and judicial determinations, and
improving deterrence of harmful restraints.
As shown above, however, the case for the quick look does not withstand
scrutiny. The quick look adds an additional layer to the analysis of restraints that
avoid per se condemnation, namely, an inquiry into whether the challenged
agreement is inherently suspect. The result of this inquiry is generally outcome
determinative, and both plaintiffs and defendants will predictably invest significant resources in attempting to convince the tribunal that the challenged restraint is or is not inherently suspect. Tribunals, in turn, will expend significant
resources assessing these contending arguments.
The significant costs of this threshold inherently suspect inquiry will produce
no offsetting benefits. In most cases, tribunals reject claims that a challenged
restraint is inherently suspect, thereby confirming the traditional result: fullblown rule of reason analysis. Even though tribunals declare some restraints
inherently suspect, they always reject defendants’ assertions that such restraints
may produce cognizable economic benefits and thus invariably condemn such
agreements. To be sure, such condemnation is less costly than condemnation
after full-blown rule of reason analysis, suggesting that application of the quick
look reduces the cost of condemning such restraints and enhances deterrence
and accuracy as well. However, any such cost savings are illusory, given that a
straightforward application of the traditional per se test—which consumes fewer
resources than the quick look—would condemn the same restraints.
Engrafting the quick look onto the traditional dichotomous approach thus
increases the costs of enforcement and adjudication without producing any
offsetting benefits. These costs are themselves a deadweight social loss, consuming resources that could produce social value elsewhere. Because defendants
will bear some of these costs, the quick look also functions as a tax on
numerous forms of concerted action that survive per se condemnation. This tax
will induce some firms at the margin to abandon agreements that tribunals
might conceivably deem inherently suspect, even if such agreements produce
benefits for the parties and consumers compared to alternatives. In other words,
the quick look is currently a lose-lose that imposes deadweight social losses and
distorts underlying economic activity.
The mere fact that the quick look, as currently structured, consumes agency,
private, and judicial resources with no offsetting benefits does not establish that
the traditional dichotomous approach is the best we can construct. This Article
has explored two possible reforms of the quick look: (1) better integration of per
se analysis with the quick look and (2) a more expansive definition of the
inherently suspect category. Neither approach, it is shown, promises any improvement over the traditional dichotomous approach.

